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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK:
THE REST OF THE STORY
PENNY J. WHITE∗ & MALIA REDDICK+
In his essay Election as Appointment: The Tennessee Plan Reconsidered,
Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick contends that Tennessee’s selection and retention
method for appellate court judges is both unconstitutional and unmeritorious.1
This Essay responds to those claims. Part I will respond to Professor
Fitzpatrick’s claim that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional; Part II will
respond to his claim that the Plan is not fulfilling the purposes which led the
Tennessee legislature, in its wisdom, to adopt it.
It is impossible, or at least disingenuous, to respond to Professor
Fitzpatrick’s essay without highlighting a multitude of significant omissions that
must be considered to fairly evaluate either the constitutionality or the merit of
the Tennessee Plan. The essay exhibits a cherry-picking tendency2 throughout
that prompts memories of Paul Harvey’s favorite line: “And now you know the
rest of the story.” This response will complete the story, mindful that “history is
the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illumines reality, vitalizes
memory, provides guidance in daily life, and brings us tidings of antiquity.”3

∗ Professor of Law and Director, Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, University
of Tennessee College of Law; former Co-Chair of the Tennessee Judicial Performance Guidelines
Committee; author of Part I of this Essay.
+ Ph.D., Michigan State University; Director of Research and Programs at the American
Judicature Society, a national nonpartisan organization dedicated to maintaining the independence
and integrity of the courts and increasing public understanding of the justice system; author of Part
II of this Essay.
1. The Tennessee General Assembly failed to pass the legislation necessary to continue the
Tennessee Plan before it adjourned in May 2008.
2. For example, Professor Fitzpatrick begins his essay by suggesting that the Tennessee
General Assembly’s decision to move to a merit selection system for appellate judges was a
response to changes in other states. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee
Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473, 473 (2008). This suggestion ignores the myriad of
circumstances that led to the 1971 legislation. See infra text accompanying notes 66–77. Before
the close of the second paragraph, the essay misinforms the reader on the mechanics of the
Tennessee Plan, describing it as marred in controversy, and stating, without attribution, that “many
people doubt” whether it has accomplished its purposes. Fitzpatrick, supra, at 473. These
propositions, even when addressed in more detail in the body of the essay, create an incomplete and,
unfortunately, misleading description of the issues that the Professor undertakes to address.
3. CICERO, PRO PUBLIO SESTIO.
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I. AN ANALYSIS OF TENNESSEE HISTORY, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TENNESSEE PLAN
Before responding to the essay’s three specific challenges to the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan, we will address two essential
cornerstones absent from its analysis. The first is the historic role of the
Tennessee legislature in judicial selection; the second are the fundamental
principles of statutory construction and constitutional interpretation.
A. The Tennessee Legislature’s Historic Role in Judicial Selection
Professor Fitzpatrick’s essay begins by suggesting that Tennessee simply fell
in line with other states in the 1970s to move from an elective to an appointive
system of judicial selection for appellate court judges.4 While the article does
briefly acknowledge that the legislature elected judges for the first half of
Tennessee’s history,5 it does not recognize the continued integral role that the
Tennessee legislature would play in judicial matters. Described as “preeminent,”
the first Tennessee legislature was granted the power to elect most state officers.6
That the legislature would also control the creation of the courts and the selection
of judges was never doubted.
1. The Constitution of 1796
As historians have noted, any discussion of Tennessee’s constitutional
history must begin with a discussion of North Carolina’s constitutional history.7
This is because Tennessee “as the daughter of North Carolina, quite naturally
adopted the judicial system of the Mother State.”8 Similar to most of the original
states, the North Carolina legislature controlled the state, choosing both the
governor (described as “little more than a dependency of the legislature”)9 and the
judges.10 The early constitutions of North Carolina and Tennessee therefore

4. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 473.
5. Id. at 478–79.
6. N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection—The Tennessee Experience, 7 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 615, 619 (1977).
7. LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (1990).
8. SAMUEL C. WILLIAMS, PHASES OF THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
5 (1944). It is surmised that Tennessee’s frontier leaders chose to follow the North Carolina model
in order to add “respectability” to their separatist movement. Parks, supra note 6, at 619.
9. WALLACE MCCLURE, STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO
TENNESSEE 33–35 (1916); see TENN. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1796) (“The governor shall be chosen by
the electors of the members of the general assembly . . . .”).
10. MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 35.
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provided for the legislative election of judges,11 and left “the establishment of
courts entirely to the legislature.”12 Both constitutions contained sections which
were entitled “Election of Judges,” and both provided for these judicial
“elections” by joint ballot of the two houses of the General Assembly.13 From its
initial use in Tennessee’s first constitution, the word “elect” has maintained a
broad and generic meaning.14
Tennessee’s first constitution, adopted in 1796, granted judicial power to the
courts, but retained for the legislature all power to establish courts, set their
jurisdiction, and determine the methods for the selection of judges.15 This
legislative preeminence was consistent with the model of the times in which most
governmental power was entrusted to a legislative body.16 It follows that the
legislature would be entrusted to elect the judiciary.17

11. The original draft of the 1796 constitution included the creation of a constitutional
superior court comprised of three judges. This significant departure from the North Carolina model
was not adopted. JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
TENNESSEE 149 (2d ed. 1907). Rather, the 1796 Tennessee Constitution provided that “[t]he
judicial power of the state shall be vested in such superior and inferior courts of law and equity, as
the legislature shall, from time to time, direct and establish.” TENN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796).
12. CALDWELL, supra note 11, at 149.
13. TENN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1796); N.C. CONST. art. XIII (1776); see MCCLURE, supra
note 9, at 424–25.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 26–50.
15. See TENN. CONST. art. V, §§ 1–12 (1796); Lewis L. Laska, The Tennessee Constitution,
in TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 7, 8 (John R.
Vile & Mark Byrnes eds., 1998); MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 48 (“An article of twelve sections
defines in considerable detail the judicial system of the state, but leaves the establishment of the
courts and the appointment of the judges entirely to the legislature . . . .”). In his book, Joshua
Caldwell suggests that the detail contained in the several sections was more a result of oversight
than intention. When the initial proposal for the creation of a superior court set forth in article V,
section 1 was defeated, Caldwell asserts that the remaining portions were “not carefully recast.”
CALDWELL, supra note 11, at 150.
16. MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 138.
17. The state’s early history is replete with colorful descriptions of judges elected by the
legislature. Because the constitution provided for election by both houses of the legislature, the
chore often involved multiple ballots and numerous candidates. One such election, described as one
of the “hottest races in judicial annals” was that of Justice Robert J. McKinney, an Irishman.
McKinney was elected on the seventh ballot in the legislature despite his having written a letter of
recommendation for the other candidate. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 55 n.18. Justice McKinney
was later praised as the supreme court’s best opinion writer, noted for his “incisive . . . and logical
[opinions] marked by [their] brevity and unusual clarity and exactness.” Id. at 56. But he was
deemed “unelectable” by the people because “he had not the parts or arts of the politician.” Id.; see
also Timothy S. Huebner, Judicial Independence in an Age of Democracy, Sectionalism, and
War, 1835–1865, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 61, 84–85 (James W. Ely ed.,
2002).
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2. The Creation of the Tennessee Supreme Court
The 1796 Tennessee Constitution referred to superior and inferior courts but
neither provided for a court of last resort, nor mandated the existence of any
court.18 In fact, courts only existed if, and when, and as long as the legislature
desired.19 The Tennessee Supreme Court was not created until 1809,20 was not
given appellate jurisdiction until 1819,21 and did not become exclusively an
appellate court until 1834.22 Even then, the legislature maintained the power to
abolish the supreme court since it was not created by the constitution.23 It was
not until 1835, when the constitution of 1834 was adopted, that the supreme
court was given constitutional stature sufficient to save it from the control of or
abolition by the legislative branch.24
3. The Constitution of 1834
Although the constitution of 1834 insured the existence of a state supreme
court, by vesting the judicial power of the state in “one Supreme Court [and] in
such Inferior Courts as the Legislature shall from time to time ordain and
establish,”25 the legislature retained its power to elect the judges.26 Using
virtually identical language to that used in the constitution of 1796, and under the
same heading “Election of Judges,” the 1834 constitution provided for judicial
election by “joint vote of both Houses.”27 Immediately following that provision,
the 1834 constitution provided that “Judges of the Supreme Court shall be
elected for the term of twelve years.”28 Thus, the State persisted in its generic
and broad use of the term “elect.” The legislative election of judges to twelveyear terms was viewed as preferable because the judges “did not have to fear
insecurity for a reasonably long period,”29 nor did they have to “engage in a
18. TENN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796) (“The judicial power of the state shall be vested in such
superior and inferior courts . . . as the legislature shall, from time to time, direct and establish.”); see
WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 75.
19. TENN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796) (“The judicial power shall be vested in such superior
and inferior courts . . . as the legislature shall, from time to time, direct and establish.”).
20. Initially the Tennessee Supreme Court included two members who were joined for
decision with a circuit judge who had heard the case below. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 75.
21. Id. Originally, the supreme court heard some appeals from circuit court but also
maintained original jurisdiction in other cases. Id.
22. Id. at 75–76.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. at 76–77.
25. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1834).
26. Id. art. VI, § 3.
27. Id. The only difference in the 1796 and 1834 provisions is that the 1796 provision used
the phrase “joint ballot of both houses” while the 1834 provision used the phrase “joint vote of both
Houses.” See MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 424–25.
28. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1834) (emphasis added); see MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 424.
29. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 46. Judges were originally elected to “hold their respective
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struggle for official survival [which was described as] always a bitter experience
for a judge-like judge.”30
Although the 1834 constitution corrected what was regarded as the “most
conspicuous deficit of the old Constitution”31 by completing the proper
distribution of governmental power into three separate and independent branches,
it continued to assert legislative authority over the manner and details of judicial
selection. Although five resolutions were offered at the 1834 Constitutional
Convention to provide for the popular election of judges, each failed in turn.32
The newly created supreme court acknowledged the legislature’s control, but
exercised independence when cases required it. In 1836, for example, the court
avowed that even though the legislature elected the judges, it was not the
sovereign of the judiciary: “The fact that the constitution may prescribe that the
mode of appointing the judges shall be by the legislature does not constitute the
legislature the [courts’] constituent. . . .[T]he legislature is not sovereign; . . . it is
not the constituent of the courts, nor are they its agents . . . .”33
4. The Constitutional Amendment of 1853
In the late 1840s the issue of judicial selection divided the two prevailing
parties, the Democrats and the Whigs. In 1849, Tennessee elected Democratic
governor William Trousdale. Trousdale advocated for a popularly elected
judiciary based on the encouragement of Andrew Johnson, then a United States
Congressman.34 Johnson’s support for a popularly elected judiciary was not
principled. Rather, it was purely political, based on his belief that since the
Whigs were in control, they would oppose any change that might reduce their
power.35
When Johnson co-opted the media into the debate, they reframed the issue as
one involving the public’s competency to select their own judges.36 With the
offices during their good behavior.” TENN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1796).
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 46. But see CALDWELL, supra note 11, at 149–50
(suggesting that the legislative control was because most of those in attendance at the 1796
Constitutional Convention were not lawyers and were not aware of the importance of an
independent judiciary); Morton J. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of
American Law, 1780–1820, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 297–98 (Donald
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (expressing yet another viewpoint, that because of the view
that common law was static, little attention was paid to concerns regarding judicial independence).
31. JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF TENNESSEE 109
(1st ed. 1895).
32. STATE OF TENNESSEE, JOURNAL OF THE 1834 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE 27, 34, 39, 53–54, 96–97 (1834).
33. Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 44, 55 (1836).
34. Parks, supra note 6, at 626–28.
35. Id. (citing 1 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 509 (L. Graf & R. Haskins, eds. 1970));
id. at 628 (“As an initial promoter of a popularly elected judiciary, Johnson probably recognized the
change as a potential way to root more Whigs out of public office.”).
36. Parks, supra note 6, at 627; see also Huebner, supra note 17, 86–88.
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issue framed as one of public trust, the Whigs became leery of opposing proposed
judicial reforms. The cross-party support and media attention led to the 1851
legislative resolution to amend the constitution.37 That year, both gubernatorial
candidates campaigned in favor of the amendment.38 In the summer of 1853,39
the voters approved the amendment which provided that the “[j]udges of the
Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State.”40
5. The Constitution of 1870
Less than two decades later, Tennessee would undertake a complete revision
of its constitution occasioned by the aftermath of the Civil War, the election of
President Lincoln, and Reconstruction. The leaders at the 1870 Constitutional
Convention believed that the changes they made to the existing constitution
would be short-lived. The “nestor” of the Convention, Judge
A. O. P.
Nicholson, cautioned the delegates to only do what was absolutely necessary
because “ten years from now all this must be done again.”41
Paying heed to Judge Nicholson’s warnings, it appears that the delegates did
very little of consequence to the judicial article in 1870.42 Proposals made to
revise judicial selection, terms of office, and impeachment provisions were all
rejected.43 But inserted between the two sentences of article VI, section 3 (the
1853 amendment that provided for the election of judges by the qualified voters)
was this provision: “The Legislature shall have the power to prescribe such rules
37. For a record of the story of events leading to the amendment, see Huebner, supra note
17, at 85–89. The Nashville Union railed against legislative appointment of judges, likening the
process to “species of log-rolling and bargaining,” and argued that an independent judiciary was
“necessary only in a monarchy . . . .” Id. at 86.
38. Parks, supra note 6, at 627. Under the 1834 Tennessee Constitution, governors were
elected for two year terms. TENN. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1834).
39. The amendment was not submitted to the voters until 1853 because the constitution
required that amendments be passed by two-thirds of the votes of two subsequent legislative
sessions before being submitted to the voters. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1834).
40. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (as amended in 1853); Laska, supra note 15, at 9.
41. CALDWELL, supra note 11, at 300. Some commentators suggest that “many of the
[changes] deal with matters which are proper subjects of legislation, and not of constitutional
regulation. . . . [T]hey are provisions which are too much dignified by places in the organic law and
should be relegated to their proper rank, as stautes.” CALDWELL, supra note 31, at 152–55 (listing
article VI’s changes as to the election and ages of judges as among the “unimportant” amendments
better left to legislative acts).
42. The 1870 Constitutional Convention has been described as a “political expedient,
designed to restore to citizenship and to the mastery of affairs, the majority of the white voters of the
State, who had been disenfranchised by a minority party which the war had placed in power.”
CALDWELL, supra note 31, at 147.
43. During the debates, some members suggested that differences between the function and
locations of trial and appellate court judges might be a legitimate basis for differentiation in selection
methods. See STATE OF TENNESSEE, JOURNAL OF THE 1870 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE 124 (1870); see also CALDWELL, supra note 11, at 318–21.
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as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section two of this article.”44
The referenced “section two” is the constitutional provision creating the supreme
court.45 Most importantly, the legislature was not given the power to prescribe
rules relative to the election of circuit, chancery, or inferior court judges.46
Apparently the legislature was not prepared to relinquish complete authority over
the appellate judiciary.
6. The Legislature and the Courts Today
a. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
This legislative entanglement with the judiciary, which began in the initial
days of statehood, permeates Tennessee’s constitutional history.47 Moreover, the
intertwinement remains vibrant today in the applicable constitutional provisions.
Three separate constitutional articles contain provisions that relate to the
Tennessee court system. Each in turn is linked with the legislature. The first and
most basic provision, found in the Declaration of Rights, provides that the
legislature may direct the manner and the courts in which suits may be brought.48
The second set of provisions, set out in article VII, relates to state and county
officers.49 Section 4 of article VII grants the legislature the power to make
provisions for “the election of all officers, and the filling of all vacancies not
otherwise directed or provided by th[e] Constitution . . . .”50
The third and most significant collection of provisions are those set out in
article VI, entitled the “Judicial Department.”51 The fifteen sections of the
judicial article consign much to the legislature, including the power to create and
abolish courts, to alter jurisdiction, and to set salaries and recusal standards.52 By
statute, the legislature has filled much of the void left by the constitution. It has
44. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1870).
45. Id. § 2.
46. Id. § 4.
47. As one commentator has noted, “the Tennessee practice of frequent legislative tinkering
with the judiciary was begun early in the state’s political life.” LEWIS L. LASKA, TENNESSEE LEGAL
RESEARCH HANDBOOK (1977).
48. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1870).
49. Id. art. VII, §§ 1–4.
50. Id. § 4.
51. Id. art. VI, §§ 1–15.
52. See, e.g., id. at § 1 (legislature may “ordain and establish” inferior courts and may “vest”
jurisdiction in Corporation Courts as necessary); id. § 2 (legislature may restrict and regulate the
supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction); id. § 3 (legislature may prescribe rules for the selection of
supreme court judges); id. § 6 (legislature may remove judges from office); id. § 7 (legislature set
judges’ salaries); id. § 8 (legislature may change the jurisdiction of the circuit, chancery, and other
inferior courts); id. § 11 (legislature shall set standards for relationship recusal and may provide for
the appointment of special judges); id. § 15 (legislature shall divide the state into judicial districts
and may provide for the appointment of justices of the peace).
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enacted legislation that establishes the terms of court,53 the location of court
houses,54 and the site for appellate judges’ chambers;55 it has set the judges’
salaries;56 it has devised methods for replacing judges upon death, illness, or
retirement;57 and it has even mandated an annual training conference.58
Among the most significant of the legislature’s enactments pertaining to the
judiciary is the legislation creating the intermediate courts of appeal. Prior to
their permanent creation, the legislature occasionally created temporary appellate
panels to help reduce the supreme court’s growing case load.59 The legislature
created the first lasting appellate court, and the predecessor to Tennessee’s
current Court of Appeals, by statute in 1895.60 This court, the Court of Chancery
Appeals, had purely appellate jurisdiction and its decisions were reviewed only
for legal error.61 In 1907, the number of judges on the intermediate appellate
court was increased, its jurisdiction was enlarged, and its name was changed to
the Court of Civil Appeals.62 A subsequent name change and increase in
membership in 1925 would create the Court of Appeals, today’s intermediate
court for appeals for civil cases.63 More than forty years later, the legislature
would follow the same procedure in creating the intermediate appellate court for
criminal cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals.64
By the time the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals was created, the
Tennessee Law Revision Commission, in conjunction with the Tennessee Bar
Association and a lay citizen’s organization, was advocating an overhaul of the
state’s judicial system.65 Their efforts to call a constitutional convention to
institute reform were unsuccessful, but their voices were heard.

53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-2-103 (1994 & Supp. 2007). For more than fifty years, the
legislature also dictated the dates of court in each judicial circuit. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-207
to -255 (Supp. 1979).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-2-102 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
55. Id. § 16-5-113.
56. Id. § 8-23-103.
57. Id. §§ 17-2-116, 17-3-101.
58. Id. §§ 16-3-802, 17-3-105.
59. LASKA, supra note 47, at 71. The first such panel was known as the Arbitration
Commission. Between 1873 and 1883, this body heard cases at the request of the parties and
reported its findings to the supreme court. Id. In 1883, the Arbitration Commission was replaced
with the Referees Commission which heard cases referred to it by the supreme court and then
reported its findings back to that court. Id. By legislative dictate, neither Commission was
permitted to publish its findings and its holdings were “without precedential value.” Id.
60. 1895 Tenn. Pub. Acts 113; LASKA, supra note 47, at 71–72.
61. LASKA, supra note 47, at 72.
62. 1907 Tenn. Pub. Acts 232; LASKA, supra note 47, at 72 .
63. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 690; LASKA, supra note 47, at 72–73.
64. 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts 587; LASKA, supra note 47, at 73–74.
65. Frank N. Bratton, Report on Tennessee Citizens’ Conference to Improve the
Administration of Justice, TENN. BAR J., May 1966, at 13, 13–16.
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b. The 1971 Tennessee Plan
In 1971, a bipartisan Tennessee legislature provided for the merit selection of
appellate judges. The legislative intent behind merit selection could not have
been clearer. In passionate floor debates and an expressive preamble, the
Tennessee legislature articulated the unambiguous purpose of merit selection: to
secure a highly qualified, apolitical appellate bench.66 The introductory section of
the new legislation provided:
It is the declared purpose and intent of the general assembly of Tennessee by the
passage of this chapter to assist the governor in finding and appointing the best
qualified persons available for service on the appellate courts . . . and to assist
the electorate of Tennessee to elect the best qualified persons to said courts; to
insulate the judges of said courts from political influence and pressure; to
improve the administration of justice; to enhance the prestige of and respect for
the said courts by eliminating the necessity of political activities by appellate
justices and judges; and to make the said courts “nonpolitical.”67

In the remaining provisions of the chapter, the legislature dictates the
application process,68 the nomination process,69 the appointment process,70 and
the subsequent election process.71 Consistent with the terminology used
throughout Tennessee’s history, the statute provides that every eight years, and in
other years in the case of interim appointments, appellate judges who “seek
election” must declare their “candidacy for reelection” by filing a written
declaration of candidacy.72 When declarations are timely filed, election officials
are required to place, on the ballot, the question: “Shall (Name of Candidate) be
elected and retained in office as (Judge) of the (Name of Court)?”73 If a majority
of the voters of Tennessee “vote in favor of reelecting” the candidate, the
candidate “is duly elected to office . . . and given a certificate of election.” 74
Nothing about these statutory prescriptions alarmed scholars of Tennessee
constitutional history. They had always recognized that the details of judicial

66. Parks, supra note 6, at 633–34 (citing Senator Edward C. Blank, II, Senate Debate of
April 29, 1971, on tape at the Tennessee State Archives).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (1994 & Supp. 2007) (originally enacted on May 12, 1971
at 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510 and later codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-701 (Supp. 1976))
(emphasis added).
68. Id. § 17-4-110 (previously codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-710 (Supp. 1976)).
69. Id. § 17-4-102 (previously codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-702 (Supp. 1976)).
70. Id. § 17-4-112 (previously codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-712 (Supp. 1976)).
71. Id. § 17-4-114 (previously codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-714 (Supp. 1976)) (for
unexpired term) (emphasis added); id. § 17-4-115 (previously codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 17715 (Supp. 1976)) (for full term) (emphasis added).
72. See sources cited supra note 71.
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at (d)(1) (emphasis added).
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selection in Tennessee were left to the legislature’s prerogative.75 While the
constitution gives the voters a say, “[t]he method of electing the judges is left to
the General Assembly.”76
Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution remains as it was drafted in 1870.
It provides few limitations on the legislative authority to create and alter the
judicial system. . . .
The Constitution provides for the election of judges for eight-year terms.
However, candidates screened for qualifications and endorsed by the governor
may be placed on the ballot for voter approval or rejection, and this method
(the Missouri Plan) may be developed by the legislature in such a manner as to
constitute election within the meaning of the Constitution.77

c. The 1974 Partial Repeal
In 1971 the legislature’s desire to secure a highly qualified, apolitical
appellate bench led to the passage of the Tennessee Plan under which
intermediate appellate and supreme court judges stood for retention elections. If
the impetus behind the 1971 passage of the Tennessee Plan was government at its
best, the 1974 repeal of the Plan for supreme court justices was politics at its
worst. The circumstances which led to the repeal, omitted from Professor
Fitzpatrick’s essay, are a significant aspect of the legislature’s historic control
over the judiciary.
After the passage of the Tennessee Plan by the bipartisan Tennessee
legislature with little or no opposition, the Plan became the spoils of a highly
partisan battle between the Republican governor and the Democratic legislature.78
Just as the 1853 amendment was not the result of a principled choice between
judicial selection methods, neither did the 1974 repeal reflect a rejection of merit
selection. In the end, the repeal of the Plan for supreme court justices had little to
do with the judiciary; rather, the Plan was a pawn to be given away in exchange
for other political favors.79
When a justice on the Tennessee Supreme Court died in 1972, the Appellate
Court Nominating Commission interviewed applicants and submitted three
75. See Laska, supra note 15, at 20.
76. Id.
77. Thomas R. Van Dervort, The Changing Court System, in TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 55, 57 (John R. Vile & Mark Byrnes eds., 1998).
78. See Parks, supra note 6, at 634; Carl A. Pierce, The Tennessee Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Independence, Accountability, and Modernization, 1974–1998, in A HISTORY OF THE
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 270, 271–73 (James W. Ely ed., 2002).
79. See Parks, supra note 6, at 634 (the repeal came “amid charges of vote-swapping on
other key legislative issues”); id. at 615 (“The partisan manner in which the . . . issue was resolved
and the superficiality of the debate on the part of both sides have, however, tended to obfuscate
rather than illuminate the significant and difficult questions posed by various methods of selecting
judges.”).
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names to Governor Winfield Dunn.80 Although the governor appointed his choice
in July, he made the appointment effective September 1.81 A lawsuit was filed by
a supreme court aspirant challenging the governor’s appointment and the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan.82 Ultimately, the court invalidated the
appointment, but upheld, without equivocation, the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan.83 The process began anew, but the governor’s first choice
withdrew from consideration.84
Following a second appointment process, some Democrats became concerned
about the likely replacements for other justices who might retire,85 and the effect
that new justices might have on the court’s appointment of the state Attorney
General,86 the composition of the State Building Commission,87 and the
construction of a medical college in East Tennessee.88 Two days after the
supreme court had upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan, the

80. Robert Keele, The Politics of Appellate Court Selection in Tennessee: 1961–1981, in
THE VOLUNTEER STATE: READINGS IN TENNESSEE POLITICS 231, 234–39 (Olshfski & Simpson eds.,
1985).
81. The death of the justice created a vacancy which was to be filled by the governor in
accordance with the merit selection appointment process. The governor was authorized to appoint
his nominee to fill out the deceased justice’s unexpired term. Rather than effectuate the
appointment immediately, the governor appointed his nominee effective September 1, 1972, the
beginning of the next term of office. Because the governor’s authority to appoint extended only to
the period of the unexpired term, his appointment for the subsequent term was invalid. State ex rel.
Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 491 (Tenn. 1973).
82. Id. Despite the appointment by Governor Dunn of Thomas F. Turley, Jr., one of the
three nominees from the Appellate Court Nominating Commission, Robert L. Taylor, announced
that he was running for the position, campaigned, and received write-in votes in forty-six counties.
He declared himself elected and was issued a certificate of election by the Secretary of State. He
then took the oath of office before a Chancellor. Id. at 482. Meanwhile, the governor issued a
commission of appointment to Turley. Id. at 482–83.
83. Id. at 490–91.
84. Keele, supra note 80, at 236.
85. Id. at 236–37. Before the death of Justice Larry Creson, all members of the court were
Democrats. See id. at 232–33. Justice Creson’s ultimate replacement was Justice Fones who
categorized himself as an Independent. Id. at 236.
86. Id. at 237. Tennessee is unique in its provision that the state Attorney General is
appointed by the supreme court. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“An Attorney General and Reporter for
the State, shall be appointed by the Judges of the Supreme Court and shall hold his office for a term
of eight years.”).
87. Keele, supra note 80, at 237. The Attorney General served on the State Building
Commission, “described at the time as ‘one of the last sources of patronage for the state’s
weakened Democrats.’” Id. Hence, the position (and the politics) of the State Attorney General
had dual importance to the legislature. Id. (“‘A switch from a Democrat to a Republican Attorney
General would shift the partisan balance on that Commission and give the Republicans control of
that body.’”).
88. Id. at 239.
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legislature began the process of repealing it as it applied to supreme court
justices.89
Governor Dunn vetoed the repealing legislation. His public statement was
unadulterated logic:
I am aware of no reasons for repealing the provisions of the 1971 [A]ct as it
relates to members of the Supreme Court and allowing the [A]ct to remain in
effect for other appellate judges. There is no basis for the establishment of a
dual system to fill appellate court vacancies. If the modified Missouri Plan
embodied in the 1971 [A]ct is desirable as the method for filling appellate court
vacancies, then it should be retained. If it is not, then it should be repealed in its
entirety. I cannot, however, sanction the establishment of a dual system.90

In seeking to repeal the Tennessee Plan’s application to supreme court
justices and to override the governor’s veto, no member of the legislature ever
suggested that the Tennessee Plan was unconstitutional. Even though the
constitutional challenge was fresh, no one asserted a legal basis for repealing the
Plan. Rather, they claimed that because justices were more “visible” than their
“regional” appellate counterparts, the “electorate could be trusted to make an
informed choice between competing candidates.”91 The governor’s veto of the
repealing statute demonstrated that the executive branch viewed the Plan as
constitutional. All of these circumstances indicate that the legislative and
executive branch concurred with the supreme court’s decision upholding the Plan.
d. The First Constitutional Challenge
Their concurrence was well founded. The supreme court’s decision in State
ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn92 was based on venerable principles of law and the
undisputed historical facts. Perhaps it is the irrefutable logic of the Dunn
decision that leads to one of the more disturbing arguments in Professor
Fitzpatrick’s essay, an argument that must be refuted before turning to the merits
of the opinion. Professor Fitzpatrick argues with regard to both Dunn and State
ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson93 that the decisions have diminished precedential
value because they were authored by “special” and not “regular” justices of the
89. 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 433, at 4; see Keele, supra note 80, at 236–37.
90. S. 88, 1st Sess., at 1523 (Tenn. 1973) (Message from Governor Dunn to the Secretary of
State on May 4, 1973). Governor Dunn’s concern over the dual system was shared by others:
The state’s present dual system, whereby trial judges and judges of the highest court are
elected, while intermediate appellate judges are appointed, is a historical anomaly which
should be corrected to reflect public interest as it is presently perceived.
. . . For the sake of consistency, one system, preferably the merit plan, should be used in
selecting all judges.
Parks, supra note 6, at 635.
91. Keele, supra note 80, at 238.
92. 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
93. No. 01S01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090, at *2 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996).
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Tennessee Supreme Court.94 This argument is particularly troublesome in light
of Professor Fitzpatrick’s assumed fortification of the constitution.
In both Dunn and Thompson, the Tennessee constitution disqualified the
“regular” justices from hearing the cases. In another constitutional provision that
proscribes institutional interference with the judiciary, the Tennessee constitution
provides that
[n]o Judge of the Supreme or Inferior Courts shall preside on the trial of any
cause in any event of which he may be interested . . . . In case all or any of the
Judges of the Supreme Court shall thus be disqualified, . . . the Court, or the
Judges thereof, shall certify the same to the Governor of the State, and he shall
forthwith commission the requisite number of men, of law knowledge, for the
trial and determination thereof.95

Since both cases related to the method by which supreme court justices would
retain their offices, all of the “regular” justices were “interested” in the cases and
were therefore disqualified from hearing them.96
Once appointed by the governor, it logically follows that “a special judge has
all the power and authority of the regular judge.”97 Otherwise the appointment
process would be in vain. Since 1835 the Tennessee law has provided that “[t]he
special judges so commissioned shall . . . have the same power and authority in
those causes as the regular judges of the court.”98 The Dunn and Thompson
opinions—and any opinions rendered by a special supreme court—are entitled to
the same weight as an opinion by the “regular” justices.99
94. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 489–90.
95. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
96. Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 99, 111 (1872) (“It is of the last importance that the
maxim that no man is to be a judge in own case, shall be held sacred, and it is not to be confined to
a cause in which he is a party, but applies to one in which he has an interest. This will be a lesson
to all inferior tribunals to take care, not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their
personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an influence.” (quoting Dimes
v. Proprietors Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 759)).
97. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 100 Tenn. 287 (1898); Brewer v. State, 74 Tenn. 198 (1880);
Henslie v. State, 50 Tenn. 202 (1871).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-103 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
99. Not only does the assertion that the “special” judges were not qualified to render a
decision on a matter of constitutional importance ignore the law, it is also wholly uninformed.
Among those who sat as members of the special appellate courts in these cases were Tennessee
legal giants. See, e.g., DeLaney v. Thompson, No. 01A01-9806-CH-00304, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 486, at *23 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1998) (“The veteran judges making up this special
court have served as judges at various times and places by every procedure known to the law:
appointment, election, interchange, retention, litigant selection, bar election and special
designation.”). The special judges who sat on the DeLaney appellate panel—Judge William S.
Russell, Judge Joe D. Duncan, and Judge Samuel L. Lewis—had more than seventy years of
combined legal experience. The special justices who sat on the DeLaney supreme court included
lawyers from all practice areas with nearly a century of combined legal experience. The special
justices in Thompson included a former chief justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court. State ex rel.
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The court in Dunn upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan without
a struggle based on established principles of constitutional law. The court first
recognized the inherent limited purpose of a constitution: to provide a broad
outline of the organization and function of government.100 Constitutions do not
“provide
the
details
for
exercising
governmental
power
. . . . [T]hey are not intended to establish all the law which, from time to time,
may be necessary to meet changing conditions.”101 Article VI, section 3 is not
self-executing. The executory details, which are not provided in the constitution,
are left to the legislature. This legislative deferral is not only consistent with
Tennessee tradition, it is also specifically addressed in the constitution.102 The
legislature assumed the duty and set forth the election details in the statutes.103
The Dunn court also applied traditional rules of construction to the terms
used in the constitution, stating that
[t]he Constitution of Tennessee does not define the words, “elect,” “election,” or
“elected” and we have not found nor have we been referred to any provision of
the Constitution or of a statute or to any decision of one of our appellate courts
defining these words. . . . [Since the Constitution in at least three instances
refers to referenda and other methods of ratification as election], it cannot be
said that [the 1971 statute] is unconstitutional because the elections therein
provided for are limited to approval or disapproval.104

A few months after the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan, the legislature, pursuant to its constitutional authority, overrode
the governor’s veto leaving Tennessee with a dual system for selecting appellate
court judges. This incongruity would remain until 1994 when the legislature
would enact a modified, incomparable plan for electing and evaluating all of
Tennessee’s appellate court judges.105

Hooker v. Thompson, No. 01S01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996).
100. State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Tenn. 1973). See generally
MCCLURE, supra note 9, at 25 (“The people, the fountain of all power, have delegated their
sovereignty to their state governing agencies, the nature and organization of which are set forth in
the constitutions . . . .”).
101. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d at 487.
102. Article VII, section 4 provides that “[t]he election of all officers, and the filling of all
vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as
the Legislature shall direct.” TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Article VI, section 3 provides that “[t]he
Legislature shall have power to prescribe such rules as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of section two of this article.” TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
103. Dunn, 497 S.W.2d at 487–88.
104. Id. at 489. The court listed dozens of statutory provisions that used the word “elect” to
describe various selection methods. Id. at 489 n.1.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 134–44.
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e. The 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention
While it is true that the citizens of Tennessee rejected a constitutional
amendment that would have specified the details for electing appellate judges, it
is disingenuous to suggest, as Professor Fitzpatrick does, that the 1977 vote
somehow affects the constitutionality of the 1994 legislation. The essay’s
incomplete discussion of Tennessee’s 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention
creates a misimpression that the professor uses to buttress many of his
arguments. The omitted details are discussed below.
The 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention was convened106 to deal with a
multitude of state problems, more than ever before undertaken in a meeting of its
kind. While the issues were many, and varied, the primary impetus for the
Convention was the state’s dire fiscal situation compounded by a constitutional
ceiling on interest rates.107 “Although other groups had been seeking to change
the constitution, lobbying by the financial industry (which included mortgage
lenders and allies in the real estate industry) was the prime cause of the 1977
Limited Constitutional Convention.”108
Although judicial reform was not a catalyst for the Convention, those who
favored court reform supported the call.109 The court reformers were not
concerned about judicial selection methods. Rather, they were concerned about
the overall inefficiency and dysfunction of the Tennessee court system. These
concerns, documented in 1971 by the Institute of Judicial Administration,110 grew
106. After adjournment, it was determined that the entire 1977 Constitutional Convention was
actually invalid because the governor had not signed the act calling for the convention. Crenshaw
v. Blanton, 606 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the constitution “does
require the signature of the Governor on a measure submitting to the voters the question of calling a
constitutional convention”). Crenshaw had filed a chancery action challenging the validity of the
act providing for the convention. On appeal, the court of appeals found a constitutional deficiency,
but was
unwilling at this late date to invalidate the amendments to the Constitution which have been
proposed by a convention called upon approval of the voters of the State who also have given
final approval to the amendments. Judicial interference with the orderly framework of
government as approved by the voters of the State is simply not justified by an omission which
cannot be said to have interfered with the free exercise of the rights of the people of the State
to change the form of their government.
Id. at 290.
107. Lewis L. Laska, The 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention, 61 TENN. L. REV. 485,
486–88 (1994). The primary promoters of the 1977 Constitutional Convention were the State
Labor Council, the Tennessee Education Association, the Tennessee County Services Association
(a lobbying group for county officials), the Tennessee Municipal League, and the Tennessee
Congress of Parents and Teachers. Id. at 488 n.12. While none of the promoting groups or
lobbyists promoted change in the state judiciary, state Supreme Court Justice Joe Henry is reported
to have desired an opportunity to modernize the Tennessee court system. Id. at 494–95.
108. Id. at 488–89 (footnote omitted).
109. Pierce, supra note 78, at 297.
110. See JOHN M. SCHEB, II & STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
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out of Tennessee’s antiquated and jumbled court system.111 The Tennessee Bar
Association and the Tennessee Law Revision Commission had sought a
convention to deal with judiciary reform in the mid-1960s. In 1968, the
legislature agreed,112 but the people defeated the call for the convention.113 When,
in 1977, it became likely that a constitutional convention would be held, efforts to
modernize the Tennessee court system began anew.
The 1977 call for convention included revisions to six of the eleven articles
of the Tennessee constitution114 For all of the articles, except one, the particular
section sought to be revised was specified.115 But the call relative to the judicial
article did not designate any particular section, but provided for consideration of
the entire article.116
When the delegates had concluded the longest and most expensive
convention in Tennessee’s history, thirteen proposed amendments were submitted
to the voters for approval. Most of the proposed amendments offered a single
proposal to the voters.117 But the amendment concerning the judicial department
MODERNIZATION: THE CASE OF THE TENNESSEE COURT SYSTEM 43–46 (The Univ. of Tenn.,
Bureau of Public Administration 1986). In 1971 the Tennessee Judicial Council created the
Institute of Judicial Administration to study and recommend court reform measures in Tennessee.
Id. at 46. The Institute documented “five serious shortcomings” of the Tennessee court system:
“(1) Problems of multi-county districting associated with the dual law/equity system . . . ; (2) ‘a lack
of functional mobility among the judges’ . . . and resulting case load inequities . . . ; (3) Judge
shopping tendencies arising from ‘an overdose of concurrent jurisdiction’ . . . ;” (4) Problems of
lack of uniformity in procedure; and “(5) An excess of judges at every level except the Supreme
Court.” Id. at 45–46. The study’s only other reflection on the appellate courts was that the
specialization in the appellate courts had produced a “high quality output with the benefits
especially pronounced at the intermediate appellate level.” Id. at 45.
111. See Frederic S. Le Clercq, The Tennessee Court System, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 185, 425
(1978); Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 56 (citing the hodgepodge court system and “judge
shopping” which created caseload inequities as the “major problem” facing the Tennessee courts).
112. See 1968 Tenn. Pub. Acts 37.
113. See JOE C. CARR, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1969–1970, at 254–
58 (1969).
114. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 1; see Governor Ray Blanton, Proclamation by the
Governor, in THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977, STATE OF TENNESSEE, THE
JOURNAL OF THE DEBATES OF THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1977 (hereinafter
Proclamation by the Governor).
115. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 1. The call listed article II, sections 8, 15, 18, and 24;
article III, sections 4 and 18; article IV, section 1; article VII, section 1 and 2; article XI, section 7,
11, 12, and 14. For article VI, the judiciary article, the call specified the entire article: “Article VI,
consisting of Sections 1 through 15.” Id.
116. Id.
117. See Proclamation by the Governor, supra note 114. For example, Proposal 1 required
the voters to vote on whether the constitutional prohibition on interracial marriage should be
repealed. Id. Proposal 3 called for the repeal of the constitutional homestead exemption. Id.
Proposal 4 allowed a governor to serve two consecutive terms. Id. Proposition 7 allowed voters age
eighteen and over to vote. Id. Proposal 10 deleted the constitutional maximum interest rate and
allowed the legislature to set the maximum rate. Id.
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contained sixteen separate proposals,118 consisting of more than 1,500 words.
The amendments affected virtually every person serving in the justice system—
judges, clerks, district attorneys, the state Attorney General, constables, and
jurors.119 Yet despite the number of separate proposals and the various
constituencies affected, the voters were not allowed to vote separately on the
provisions but were required to either accept or reject the amendment as a whole.
So complex were the changes to the judicial article that many of the delegates
professed confusion over what was included in the final proposal.120 In addition,
the proposal omitted, perhaps by political design,121 a constitutional provision
that had protected judicial salaries from legislative tinkering during a judge’s
term of office.122 This omission, coupled with the requirement of a unitary vote,
assured that the proposed amendments to the judicial article would fail.
Those who had initially supported the inclusion of the article in the call for
convention, including Chief Justice Joe Henry and the Tennessee Bar
Association, vehemently opposed its passage.123 Chief Justice Henry decried the
interference with the independence of the judiciary: “It is incredible that in the
last three quarters of the twentieth century a constitutional convention would
make judges dependent upon the good will of the legislature for their
compensation.”124 In the words of the chief justice, the amendment would assure

118. Among the proposed changes to the judicial article were a complete restructuring and
renaming of the court system; a combination of intermediate appellate courts; a reduction in the
judicial term of office; the creation of a new “Superior Court”; the abolition of the Chancery Court;
the creation of a state-wide General Sessions Court with “uniform” jurisdiction; the creation of a
Court of Discipline and Removal; a change in the method of selection and the term of office of the
State Attorney General; a reduction in the term of office of District Attorney Generals; the creation
of a state-wide indigent defense system; and the elimination of clerks and masters. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Laska, supra note 107, at 549; Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 56.
121. The proposed constitutional prohibition on altering a judge’s salary during the term of
office was ultimately tied to a similar provision protecting the salaries of district attorneys and public
defenders. This created concern and controversy, resulting in its deletion and ultimate omission
from the proposal. Laska, supra note 107, at 550.
122. Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 56. Since the founding of the Republic the issue of
removing the control of judges via reduction in salaries during terms of office had been prominent.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (“[The King] has made Judges dependent on
his Will alone for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.”); see
SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (1980).
123. Laska, supra note 107, at 570–71.
124. Id. at 551. Justice Henry was always a master of language, but his remarks to the
Tennessee Municipal League in opposition to the amendment may be among his finest. In
remembering a phrase used by Governor Gordon Browning, “Stand still, little pig, while I gut you,”
Justice Henry pronounced, “I won’t be gutted!” SCHEB & RECHICHAR, supra note 110, at 58
(quoting Kirk Loggins, Henry Launches Effort to Kill Judicial Article, NASHVILLE TENNESSEEAN,
Jan. 7, 1978, at 1).
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a “devitalized, disorganized, demoralized, and subservient judiciary”125 and
should be rejected.
It was not only the vocal opposition to the amendment that led to its failure,
but also its lack of support.
The judicial article failed because there was no strong ally in support of it,
and many discordant voices against it. The loudest was Chief Justice Joe Henry.
. . . [H]is conclusion was pure Justice Henry: “I hope the people of Tennessee
will consign the proposed judicial article to the oblivion it so richly deserves.”

Despite their overwhelming support of judicial reform, the Tennessee Bar
Association ultimately opposed the new judicial article. The Bar Association
believed that the article adversely affected the traditional notions of checks and
balances and separation of power of separate and equal branches of government.
“In the end, the judicial article was abandoned by those whom it would have
influenced the most: the supreme court (at least Justice Henry), the trial court
judges, the court clerks, and even the nonlawyer general sessions judges.”126
The legislature ultimately used its plenary powers to adopt many of the
progressive court revisions contained in the rejected amendment to the judicial
article.127 The legislature reorganized the trial court system,128 created a statewide public defender system,129 gave the supreme court extensive rulemaking
powers,130 and increased uniformity in the General Sessions Court.131 And in
1994, the legislature revised the Tennessee Plan to assure the quality of the
Tennessee appellate bench.
f.

The 1994 Tennessee Plan

When the legislature revised the Tennessee Plan, it not only reinstated
retention elections for supreme court justices, it also fashioned a merit election
system that was unique to Tennessee. The legislature restated its clear and
unambiguous purpose, first outlined in 1971: to secure a highly qualified
apolitical appellate bench.132 The Tennessee Plan was designed to assist the
governor in the initial appointment and the citizens in the subsequent elections.133
125. SCHEB & RECHICHAR, supra note 110, at 60 (quoting Kirk Loggins, Henry Launches
Effort to Kill Judicial Article, NASHVILLE TENNESSEEAN, Jan. 7, 1978, at n.45).
126. Id. at 570; see Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 55–57. According to Van Dervort, “[i]n
the end the judicial article proposal failed because there was no strong lobby in support of it and
many discordant voices, primarily those of the Chief Justice and the Tennessee Bar Association,
against it.” Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 57.
127. Van Dervort, supra note 77, at 58.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2-101 to -520 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
129. Id. §§ 8-14-201 to -212.
130. Id. § 16-3-401.
131. Id. §§ 16-3-501 to -504.
132. Id. §17-4-101.
133. Id. (“It is the declared purpose and intent of the general assembly . . . to assist the
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This time, the legislature added a feature to the Tennessee Plan that made the
Plan uniquely able to “assist the electorate” in “elect[ing] the best qualified
persons to the court.”
The added dimension of the 1994 Tennessee Plan is a judicial performance
evaluation program134 by which court personnel, lawyers, and other judges
evaluate the performance of Tennessee’s judges.135 In addition, the program
includes self-evaluation and the opportunity for judges to discuss and reflect on
their own strengths and weaknesses.136
The overriding purpose of the evaluation program is to “improve[e]
the
administration of justice in Tennessee . . . by instituting a program of continuous
self-improvement . . . that empowers the judges, with the assistance of their peers,
to enhance and to broaden their own judicial skills.”137 By assisting judges in
identifying areas in which they need to boost their judicial skills, the program
improves the overall quality of the Tennessee bench.138
But for appellate judges, the purpose of evaluation is deeper than the mere
desire for individual self-improvement. The program achieves the legislative
purpose of “assist[ing] the electorate”139 by providing information that
“promote[s] informed retention decisions.”140 Each appellate judge standing for
retention election is evaluated in order to inform the electorate about the judge’s
performance on the bench. This enables the voters to cast a more knowledgeable
vote.141
By adopting the judicial evaluation program as part of the Tennessee Plan,
the Tennessee legislature demonstrated a true commitment to assuring a quality
governor in finding and appointing the best qualified persons available for service on the appellate
courts of Tennessee, and to assist the electorate of Tennessee to elect the best qualified persons to
the courts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
134. At the time that Tennessee adopted its judicial evaluation program only nine other states
in the country had similar programs providing for the evaluation of their judges. See Marla N.
Greenstein, Dan Hall, and Jane Howell, Improving the Judiciary through Performance
Evaluations, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (American Bar
Association 7th ed. 2002); JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION HANDBOOK 3 (American Bar
Association, 1996).
135. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 1.
136. Id. at § 1.04
137. Id. at § 1.03
138. Id. at § 1.02.
139. See supra note 133.
140. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 1.05 (“In addition to its primary purpose of self-improvement,
the Judicial Performance and Evaluation Program must provide information that will enable the
Judicial Evaluation Commission to perform objective evaluations and to issue fair and accurate
reports concerning the appellate judges’ performances.”).
141. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2007) provides that “[t]he purpose of
the [judicial evaluation] program shall be to assist the public in evaluating the performance of
incumbent appellate court judges.” To this end, “ [t]he judicial evaluation program shall require
publication and disclosure of a final report.” Id. § -201(c)(1). The report is publicly available and is
published in six daily newspapers preceding the election. Id.
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appellate bench. For the last fourteen years, appellate judges in Tennessee have
been appointed by the governor, evaluated by the Judicial Evaluation
Commission, and elected by the voters.142 The system has not only provided a
unique model for other states; it has also produced a diverse and qualified
appellate bench removed from partisan politics.
g. The Second143 Constitutional Challenge144
In 1996, a perennial litigant in Tennessee state and federal courts145 filed suit
to enable himself to run for a seat on the supreme court.146 His attack on the
142. Professor Fitzpatrick complains that the Commission has recommended retention for
“every single one” of the sixty-six judges that have been evaluated since 1994. Fitzpatrick, supra
note 2, at 484. His critique implies that some of Tennessee’s judges did not deserve either a
positive evaluation or retention. An equally plausible explanation is that Tennessee’s merit selection
and evaluation system has produced good judges who do their jobs well and deserve to continue to
do so. His criticism is also irrelevant—even before Tennessee moved to a merit selection system for
its appellate judges, few appellate judicial races were contested and even fewer incumbents lost their
seats. See Harry Phillips, Our Supreme Court Justices, 17 TENN. L. REV. 466, 468 (1942)
(“Indeed, the caliber of Tennessee’s appellate judges has been such that the State has seen few
contests for the highest bench.”).
143. These two constitutional challenges and two others, one challenging the application of
the system when a judge was not evaluated, see infra note 147, and the other dismissed by the
federal court in March of this year, Johnson v. Bredesen, No. 3:07-0372, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19738 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2008), constitute the “several cases” that have caused the Tennessee
Plan to be “mired in litigation.” See Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 475.
144. I was a named defendant in the second suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan brought by Mr. John Jay Hooker. I am not unique; Mr. Hooker has sued every
sitting Tennessee Supreme Court justice, the members of the Tennessee Judicial Selection
Commission, at least three governors, and several State Attorney Generals, as well as at least two
United States Senators, the mayor of Nashville, and the Federal Election Commission. See sources
cited infra note 145.
145. With two exceptions, all of the litigation concerning the administration of the Tennessee
Plan has been filed either by or on behalf of Mr. John Jay Hooker. In addition to these suits over
the state judicial selection system, Mr. Hooker often challenges campaign finance systems in federal
elections. See, e.g., Hooker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 21 F. App’x 402 (6th Cir. 2001); Hooker v.
Thompson, 21 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2001); Hooker v. Sasser, 893 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Tenn.
1995); Hooker v. Alexander, No. M2003-01141-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 304
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2005).
146. At the time of this lawsuit, Mr. Hooker was not qualified to serve as a justice because “he
failed to meet the requirement that a candidate for Supreme Court Justice must be an attorney
licensed to practice law in Tennessee . . . .” State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, No. 01S01-9605CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090, at *2 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996). Mr. Hooker’s law license had been
suspended for his failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. Id. at *1 n.4. In
addition, Mr. Hooker resided in the Middle Grand Division of the State and could not qualify for the
seat because two sitting justices, Justice Drowota and Justice Birch, also resided in that Division.
Id.; see TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of five Judges, of whom not
more than two shall reside in any one of the grand divisions of the State.”).
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Tennessee Plan in State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson was based initially on the
fact that the sitting justice147 who was on the ballot for retention had not been
evaluated by the Judicial Evaluation Commission.148 Ultimately, a special
supreme court149 assessed and upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee
Plan.150
The decision was not unexpected. Although the legislature had added an
evaluation program to the Tennessee Plan, the remaining provisions were
identical to those upheld by the court in 1973. While the 1973 precedent was a
basis for the court’s analysis,151 it was not the sole foundation. The court also
relied upon fundamental principles of statutory construction and constitutional
interpretation essential to analyzing any constitutional challenge.
B. Fundamental Principles of Statutory Construction and
Constitutional Law
The second cornerstone omitted from Professor Fitzpatrick’s discussion is
consideration of basic principles of statutory construction and constitutional
interpretation. These principles, discussed below, are essential to evaluating the
constitutionality of any legislative act. When properly utilized to analyze the
Tennessee Plan, the principles lend further support to the conclusion that the
Tennessee Plan is constitutional.

147. To state the obvious, that sitting justice was me.
148. A similar unsuccessful attack on the Plan was mounted by at attorney seeking to run for
the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Division, in 1998. Judge Henry Todd advised the Judicial
Evaluation Commission that he did not intend to seek election at the end of his term. As a result the
Commission did not perform an evaluation of Judge Todd. An aspirant for Judge Todd’s seat
sought and received injunctive relief against the application of the Tennessee Plan, claiming the
Plan inapplicable since Judge Todd was not evaluated. The Davidson County Chancery Court
decision granting relief was reversed by a special panel of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, which
held the Tennessee Plan constitutional based upon rules of statutory and constitutional construction
and the Dunn precedent. DeLaney v. Thompson, No. 01A01-9806-CH-00304, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1998). The special court of appeals’s decision was in turn
reversed by a special supreme court which, based on equally long-standing principles, found it
unnecessary to address the issue of the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan. DeLaney v.
Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tenn. 1998) (“It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme
Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination
of the case and of the rights of parties to the litigation.”).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 93–98.
150. State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, No. 01S01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090
(Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996).
151. Id. at *3 (“The issue of whether yes/no retention elections violate the Constitution of
Tennessee has previously been decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel.
Higgins v. Dunn, and no compelling reason has been given to persuade this Court that it should
disturb that ruling.” (citation omitted)).
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1. Presumption of Constitutionality
The most basic principle of statutory construction requires that courts
indulge “every presumption” in favor of constitutional validity.152 Statutes are
presumed to be constitutional because it is within the province of the legislature
to prescribe law by which society is governed.
The principle of presumed constitutionality requires that courts indulge every
presumption in favor of upholding a legislative enactment. Every doubt as to the
viability of a statute must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. So strong is
the presumption that when two possible interpretations exist, the one that
sustains constitutionality is imposed over the other.153 Unless a plain and
unambiguous interpretation compels the conclusion that a statute violates the
constitution, the statute must be upheld.154
2. Construction to Uphold Constitutionality
In addition to the presumption of constitutionality that adheres to all statutes,
a court must construe a statute so as to preserve constitutionality.155 If a statute
lends itself to more than one construction, the construction that upholds
constitutionality must be applied. A statute must not be declared unconstitutional
if “it is possible to avoid doing so.”156 If doubt arises as to the meaning of the
provision, a court must “harmonize [the conflicting] portions and favor the
construction which will render every work operative rather than one which would
make some words idle and meaningless.”157
3. Legislative Objectives
When a statute’s constitutionality is challenged, the court must look at the
goals intended by the legislature and not the particular language used.
In construing statutes, we look at the objects aimed at by the Legislature, and
not to the particular verbiage, in which a statute, in some of its parts, may be
expressed. If the real object aimed at is within legislative competency, and can
be clearly seen from the whole statute taken together, the history of the prior
legislation upon the same subject, the Court will not be turned aside by
particular expressions, which, taken by themselves, might seem to indicate that

152. See, e.g., Bank of State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 608 (1831).
153. See, e.g., Kirk v. State, 150 S.W. 83, 85 (Tenn. 1911); Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 16 S.W.
1045, 1046 (Tenn. 1891).
154. See, e.g., Arrington v. Cotton, 60 Tenn. 316 (1872); Smith v. Normant, 13 Tenn. (5
Yer.) 271 (1833).
155. See, e.g., Consolidated Enters., Inc. v. State, 263 S.W. 74, 75 (Tenn. 1924) (describing it
as the “primary” rule); Turner v. Eslick, 240 S.W. 786, 789 (Tenn. 1921) (same).
156. Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Thompson, 276 S.W. 1050, 1051 (Tenn. 1925).
157. Shelby County v. Hale, 292 S.W.2d 745, 748–49 (Tenn. 1956).
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the Legislature was assuming to transcend its constitutional power, but will give
effect to the will of the Legislature thus discovered.158

C. The Constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan
1. The Principle of Stare Decisis in General
These fundamental rules of constitutional law and statutory construction
viewed in light of Tennessee’s constitutional history lead to the inescapable
conclusion reached by the Dunn and Thompson courts that the Tennessee Plan
does not violate the Tennessee constitution. These decisions are dismissed too
summarily by Professor Fitzpatrick. His essay discounts the importance of
judicial precedent in two ways. In general, the essay disregards the principle of
stare decisis. In particular, the essay erects illogical arguments to challenge the
principle’s application to the Dunn and Thompson decisions.
The rule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable in the construction of
written constitutions. . . . “A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is
that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical
construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to be made to mean one
thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time, when the circumstances
may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem
desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost, if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to
circumstances or be modified by public opinion.”159

The final arbiter of the Tennessee constitution has twice upheld the
Tennessee Plan against constitutional challenges. Several United States District
Courts and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have relied on the supreme court’s
holdings in dismissing countless actions challenging the Plan.160 The decisions
upholding the Tennessee Plan have uniformly held that a retention election
satisfies the constitutional requirement that the justices of the supreme court “be

158. Arrington, 60 Tenn. at 319–320.
159. McCulley v. State (The Judges’ Cases), 53 S.W. 134, 139–40 (Tenn. 1899); see also
State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 154 S.W. 1151, 1154–55 (Tenn. 1913).
160. Judges Higgins, Donald, and Campbell have all dismissed cases in which Mr. Hooker has
claimed a property interest either in the right to run for justice or in the right to vote in a popular
election of appellate judges. A threshold question in each case has been whether the Tennessee
Plan violates state constitutional law. See Hooker v. Anderson, 12 F. App’x 323 (6th Cir. 2001);
Hooker v. Thompson, 21 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2001); Hooker v. Burson, No. 96-6030, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 2682 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1997); Johnson v. Bredesen, No. 3:07-0372, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19738 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2008).
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elected by the qualified voters of the State.”161 Thus, no challenge to the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan has ever been successful.
2. The Principle of Stare Decisis applied to Dunn and Thompson
In addition to its general disregard for the importance of stare decisis, the
essay floats specious arguments against the principle’s application to the Dunn
and Thompson decisions. The first taunt, addressed previously in this article, is
that the decisions are not entitled to the effect of stare decisis because a
“majority of regular justices” did not render the decisions. In addition to ignoring
the constitutional provision requiring judicial disqualification,162 the claim defies
common sense. Advanced to its logical conclusion, Professor Fitzpatrick’s point
would create decisional chaos. Either “regular” judges would be forced to decide
matters in which they had an interest, thereby creating “good” precedent, or
substitute judges would render a decision that was of no value.
The second jab is aimed only at the Thompson decision and claims that the
decision has no precedential value because it was not published.163 This
argument relies upon a supreme court rule that specifies that certain intermediate
appellate decisions will have “no precedential value.” 164 But the unpublished
Thompson decision does not fall in that category. Moreover, consistent with the
essay’s general disregard for stare decisis, the argument ignores the fact that
Thompson relied on the precedent established twenty-five years earlier in Dunn.
3. The Essay’s Four Remaining Arguments
This paper’s earlier discussions of the legislature’s historic involvement with
the judiciary, Tennessee’s constitutional history, and fundamental principles of
constitutional law and statutory construction have exposed the fallacy of most of
the arguments against the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan. This section
makes additional observations relative to Professor Fitzpatrick’s four remaining
arguments: that the legislature cannot give the governor the authority to appoint
judges except when a midterm vacancy occurs; that retention elections are not
“elections”; that retention races cannot be reconciled with democracy; and that

161. TENN. CONST. art VI, § 3.
162. Id. § 11.
163. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 488–89, 489 n.143.
164. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4(E)(1) (“If an application for permission to appeal is hereafter denied
by this Court with a “Not for Citation” designation, the opinion of the intermediate appellate court
has no precedential value.”); cf. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4(G)(1) (“An unpublished opinion shall be
considered controlling authority between the parties to the case when relevant under the doctrines
of the law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or in a criminal, post-conviction, or habeas
corpus action involving the same defendant. Unless designated “Not For Citation,” “DCRO” or
“DNP” pursuant to subsection (F) of this Rule, unpublished opinions for all other purposes shall be
considered persuasive authority.”).
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the electorate’s rejection of the 1977 constitutional amendment is evidence that
the Tennessee Plan in unconstitutional.
a. The Legislature May Authorize the Governor to Fill all
Appellate Court Vacancies
Professor Fitzpatrick claims that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional “to
the extent [it] permits the governor to appoint a new judge to a position created
when the previous judge served [a] full term . . . .”165 If the legislature may
empower the governor to fill end-of-term vacancies, Professor Fitzpatrick
contends that the vacancy provision would nullify the election provision.166 This
argument fails for two reasons. First, it is contradicted by the plain language of
the constitution. Second, its legitimacy depends upon a forced, incorrect
construction of the word “vacancy.”
The constitution requires the legislature to determine the manner for filling
all vacancies not otherwise provided for in the constitution.167 This includes
vacancies in the appellate courts. In circumscribing the legislature’s power, the
constitution has placed a limitation on the period of the appointment, providing
that “[n]o appointment or election to fill a vacancy shall be made for a period
extending beyond the unexpired term.”168 The legislature has abided by this
constitutional mandate by providing that the term of an appointed judge expires
on August 31 following the next biennial election.169 The appointed judge either
must be “elected by the qualified voters of the State,” at that election or cease to
serve;170 otherwise the appointment would be in violation of the constitutional
limitation imposed on the period of appointment. By virtue of these provisions,
no appointed judge is able to avoid an election.
In fulfilling its constitutional mandate to determine the manner for filling
vacancies, the legislature, by statute, has authorized the governor to fill all
appellate court vacancies.171 The statute plainly provides that “[w]hen a vacancy
occurs in the office of an appellate court . . . by death, resignation, or otherwise,
the governor shall fill the vacancy by [appointment.]”172 The language makes it

165. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 492.
166. Id. at 491–92.
167. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
168. Id. § 5.
169. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112(b) (1994 & Supp. 2007).
170. Id.
171. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112 provides that
(a) When a vacancy occurs in the office of an appellate court after September 1, 1994, by
death, resignation or otherwise, the governor shall fill the vacancy by appointing one (1) of the
three (3) persons nominated by the judicial selection commission, or the governor may require
the commission to submit one (1) other panel of three (3) nominees. . . .
(b) The term of a judge appointed under this section shall expire on August 31 after the
next regular August election occurring more than thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs.
172. Id. § 17-4-112(a) (emphasis added).
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clear that all vacancies are to be filled by gubernatorial appointment. To
circumvent this plain language used in the constitution and statute, Professor
Fitzpatrick relies upon a forced and incorrect definition of the term “vacancy,”
surmising that the “constitution uses the word ‘vacancies’ to refer only to interim
vacancies.”173 This strained construction is directly contradicted by more than a
century of Tennessee law.
While neither the constitution nor the statute defines “vacancy,” the courts
have applied a consistent and unambiguous definition. The term is used in its
ordinary sense, not in a limited or special one: “There is no technical or peculiar
meaning to the word ‘vacant’ when applied to office. It means unoccupied,
without an incumbent, regardless of whether it was ever filled, or when or how
it subsequently became without an incumbent.”174
Professor Fitzpatrick suggests that the issue of the constitutionality of
gubernatorial appointments for end-of-term vacancies remains viable because
“[n]one of the courts that have considered the constitutionality of the Tennessee
Plan have addressed this point.”175 This argument disregards the plain
unequivocal language of the appointment statute and recent precedent. The
statute requires the governor to fill all vacancies created by “death, resignation or
otherwise.”176 “Otherwise” means “in another way, or in other ways.”177 Thus,
the governor must fill vacancies created by death, resignation, or created in any
other way.
The only legitimate judicial interpretation of the statute is that the governor
fills all appellate court vacancies, not just vacancies occurring midterm. This
was the interpretation applied to the statute by the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee in Johnson v. Bredesen. The District Court
held that the statute “makes it abundantly clear” that it applies to vacancies
created by appellate judges deciding not to pursue a new eight-year term. That
vacancy “is to be filled by gubernatorial appointment followed by a retention
election held at the next biennial August election . . . .”178
173. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 475 (“[I]t appears that the constitution uses the word
‘vacancies’ to refer only to interim vacancies—i.e., where the judges leave in the middle of their
terms—rather than to positions that are vacant simply because judges choose not to run for
reelection.”).
174. Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664, 683 (Tenn. 1910); accord Conger v. Roy, 267
S.W. 122, 125 (Tenn. 1924); Ashcroft v. Goodman, 202 S.W. 939, 940 (Tenn. 1918); State ex rel.
Gann v. Malone, 174 S.W. 257, 259 (Tenn. 1915); State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d
567, 573–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
175. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 492.
176. TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-112(a) (1994 & Supp. 2007).
177. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 984 (2d ed. 1989).
178. Johnson v. Bredesen, No. 3:07-0372, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33897, at *16 n.5 (M.D.
Tenn. May 8, 2007). In this case, plaintiffs, which included the Tennessee Center for Policy
Research, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in United States District Court on
the basis that it denied voters their Fourteenth Amendment property right to vote for a judge in a
contested judicial election. Id. at *3. Mr. Johnson’s suit was consolidated with Mr. Hooker’s.
Among the challenges was an attack on the authority of the governor to appoint a judge for an end-
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b. Retention Elections are Elections
Professor Fitzpatrick next argues that a retention election is unconstitutional
because it cannot be reconciled with either traditional notions of democracy nor
traditional definitions of election. In reality, his argument is that retention
elections fail to satisfy his own definition of “election” and his concept of
democracy.
The first argument—that a retention election does not fit the definition of
election—fails because it turns on the assumption that the word “elect” means a
popular election between candidates. The argument runs counter to the most
basic tenets of construction. Words must be given their natural and ordinary
meaning. They must be construed in a common-sense fashion so as to not create
inconsistencies within a document. To construe the word “elect” to refer
specifically to popular elections would lead to internal conflict within the
constitution. Rather than creating conflict by construction, courts are required to
“‘harmonize such portions and favor the construction which will render every
word operative . . . .’”179 By construing the word “elect” broadly to mean any
kind of a selection process, the Tennessee courts have honored their obligation as
interpreters of the law.
As a general proposition, neither “elect” nor “election” have a unilocular
meaning. The word “elect” has many definitions and dozens of applications.180
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “elect” to mean “[t]o choose (a person)
by vote for appointment to an office or position of any kind.”181 Other definitions
include “to choose” and “to select.” While the word undoubtedly describes a
selection process, it does not demarcate, nor mandate, the details of the process.
Rather, it provides flexibility and a wide range of options.
None of Tennessee’s constitutions have defined the term “elect,” but all of
them have used the word interchangeably to refer to numerous different selection
processes. These include popular elections, legislative appointments, legislative
balloting, retention elections, referenda, and ratifications, to name but a few.182
While Professor Fitzpatrick criticizes the Tennessee Supreme Court for
of-term vacancy. Id. at *14–15. The has been dismissed for failure to state a claim. Johnson v.
Bredesen, No. 3:07-0372, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19738 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2008).
179. State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, No. 01S01-9605-CH-00106, 1996 WL 570090
(Tenn. Oct. 2, 1996) (quoting Shelby County v. Hale, 292 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tenn. 1956)).
180. See generally Erica Klarreich, Election Selection, 162 SCI. NEWS 280 (2002) (comparing
plurality voting with other voting procedures used internationally, based upon principles of
mathematics); Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportionate, Majoritarian, and
Mixed, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 297, 299 (1997) (discussing four major categories of election types
with at least twelve subcategories).
181. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 115 (2d ed. 1989). In the seminal early work on
judicial retention elections in the United States, the authors likewise refer to retention elections as
elections. CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 122, at 3.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32, 49–66. Similarly, as the Tennessee Supreme
Court has pointed out, the word is used in multiple ways in the Tennessee statutes. State ex rel.
Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 489 n.1 (Tenn. 1973) (listing thirteen separate statutory uses).
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considering these various constitutional provisions183 this interpretive mechanism
used by the court in Dunn and Thompson is the very core of statutory
construction.184 By reference to other election procedures in the constitution, the
court determined that retention elections satisfy the constitutional requirement.
In all of the various election processes provided for in the constitution, the
details of the process have been left to legislative design. This is consistent with
the recognition that the purpose of a constitution is to provide a general
framework for government. It is neither appropriate nor desirable for a
constitution to contain exhaustive details; doing so would limit the document’s
vitality over time.
Consistent with the underlying purpose of a constitution, the Tennessee
judicial article provides generally for an electoral process but leaves the details to
statute. The constitutional requirement that “the judges of the Supreme Court
shall be elected by the qualified voters of the state”185 is satisfied by any process
by which the voters have a right to choose or select. In retention elections, voters
choose whether a judge remains in office. By giving voters this choice, the
constitutional requirement of an election is fulfilled.
Professor Fitzpatrick expresses concern that if the term “elect” is broadly
construed consistent with the Dunn decision “then the legislature might permit
governors to win second terms in uncontested retention referenda . . . .”186 The
sincere, albeit curt, response is “Yes, and your point is . . . ?” The simple truth is
that the legislature could do so. It would not be unconstitutional, as a general
proposition, for a state to have a retention election for governor or for any elected
office. The fact that such a process might be unwise or unpopular does not mean
that it would be unconstitutional. To the extent that the constitution does not
mandate a particular electoral process for an office, it allows any process that
involves some selection or choice.
c. Retention Elections Satisfy Democracy
Professor Fitzpatrick reasons that because retention elections were not
customary when the constitution of 1870 was passed, they could not have been
contemplated nor intended under its terms.187 But he readily concedes that
constitutions are intended to provide a general outline conducive to flexible
interpretation, not a comprehensive description embracing every potential issue
183. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 492–94.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 152–58.
185. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The very next sentence confirms legislative involvement in
the details of the election. It provides that the “[l]egislature shall have power to prescribe such rules
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section two of this article.” The specific
reference to section two does not limit the general power of the legislature to provide the details of
the election process, but simply reiterates that the power is to be used to assure that no more than
two judges reside in any of the state’s three divisions. Id. § 2–3.
186. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 493.
187. Id. at 494.
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that might arise.188 Moreover, he admits that the 1870 constitution used the word
“elect” to refer to yes/no votes.189 His criticism of the Dunn court for relying on
two later amendments also providing for yes/no votes is unwarranted because not
only did the 1870 constitution use the word “elect” to include yes/no votes, so did
the two previous constitutions.190 The fact that those who authored the document
used the word even a single time to describe yes/no voting is sufficient to
establish that it was understood and contemplated at the time.
Professor Fitzpatrick next suggests that retention elections might be valid if
they “serve the democratic purposes of the 1870 constitution just as well as
contested elections do.” In essence, he constructs his own test for determining
whether retention elections are constitutional. In order to do so, he continues to
presuppose a rigid and forced construction of the word “elect” which cannot be
justified.191 The test that he creates is whether retention elections “facilitat[e]
democractic accountability” as well as popular elections. The suggestion is that
retention elections survive constitutional scrutiny only if they equal popular
elections in facilitating accountability. But both the choice of this standard—
“facilitating democratic accountability”—and the definition of accountability that
is implicit in the essay’s discussion are the author’s alone.
Retention elections may be inconsistent with some ideas of democracy. But
just as there is no one meaning of “elect,” there is no one meaning of democracy.
Without a doubt, the frontier Tennesseeans believed they were creating a
democracy when they adopted the early constitutions. Yet both the 1796 and
1835 constitutions provided for the appointment of judges and the governor by
the legislature. And while it is true that the 1870 constitution coincided with the
development of Jacksonian democracy, the framers did not provide that judges
would be popularly elected. Instead, they used the same word that they used to
refer to yes/no votes on referenda, ratifications, and other approval processes.192
If the provisions of the 1870 constitution must accomplish “democratic
accountability,” and if, as Professor Fitzpatrick suggests, democratic
accountability may be accomplished only by popular elections or their equivalent,
then dozens of provisions of the Tennessee constitution and hundreds of
Tennessee statutes are invalid. Surely, for example, the legislative election of the
Speakers, Treasurer, and Comptroller193 does not “serve[] the democratic
purpose[] . . . as well as contested elections”;194 neither do the legislative
appointments of interim members195 or the Secretary of State.196 Yet the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id at 493–94.
See supra text accompanying notes 15, 30.
See supra text accompanying notes 181–86.
See TENN. CONST. art. II, § 15; id. art. III, § 2.
Id. art. II, § 11; id. art. VII, § 3; see David Carleton, The Governorship, in TENNESSEE
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 41, 47 (John R. Vile & Mark
Byrnes eds., 1998).
194. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 495.
195. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 15.
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constitution specifically provides for these selection methods.197 Similarly, the
constitution provides for the gubernatorial appointment of judges (when regular
judges are disqualified)198 and temporary constitutional officers;199 and for the
appointment of the Attorney General200 and the Clerks of the Court201 by the
supreme court. None of these appointment processes provides for democratic
accountability in the way that a popular election does, but all are nonetheless
constitutional.
Similarly, numerous statutes vest the power to appoint judges, sometimes
permanently and sometimes temporarily, in either the executive or legislative
branch. For example, the governor is empowered to fill judicial positions created
by death, resignation, and removal202 and to appoint special judges to hear cases
when sitting judges are disqualified by sickness, incompetency, or disability.203
The chief justice of the supreme court may appoint special judges;204 county and
municipal bodies appoint county and municipal judges;205 sitting judges may
appoint substitute judges,206 and until 1997, with consent, the parties to a civil
suit could appoint their own judge.207
Just as retention elections may be inconsistent with some ideas of democracy,
they may also be inconsistent with some ideas of judicial accountability. Without
196. Id. art. III, § 17.
197. The constitution also provides that the legislature has the power to determine the method
of selection for all officers not otherwise provided for. Id. art. VII, § 4. As one commentator
explained, “[n]ow the legislature can call for an election or otherwise specify how an officer is to be
selected.” LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 129
(1990).
198. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
199. Id. art. III, § 14.
200. Id. art. VI, § 5.
201. Id. § 13.
202. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-301(a) (1998). The current version of the statute refers to a
vacancy which occurs as a result of “death or other disqualifying event.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1301(a) (1994 & Supp. 2007).
203. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-102 (1994 & Supp. 2007) (incompetency); id. § 17-2-104
(illness); id. § 17-2-105 (incompetency, sickness, or disability of intermediate appellate judges); id.
§ 17-2-107 (incompetency, sickness, or disability of general sessions judges); id. § 17-2-115 (giving
governor the power to appoint a judge in the event of incompetency); id. § 17-2-116 (giving
governor the power of appointment in the event that a judge is certified as ill or disabled; providing
that if the judge subsequently dies or retires, the successor shall continue to serve “until such time
as the successor . . . is duly elected, qualified and installed in office in the manner provided by law . .
. .”). The procedure set forth in section 17-2-116 has been at issue in all cases challenging the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan.
204. Id. § 17-2-109(a)(1).
205. Id. § 17-1-303 (county judges); id. § 16-18-101 (municipal judges).
206. Id. § 17-2-118(a) (“If, for good cause, including, but not limited to, by reason of illness,
physical incapacitation, vacation or absence from the city or judicial district on a matter related to
the judge’s judicial office, the judge of a state or county trial court of record is unable to hold court,
such judge shall appoint a substitute judge to hold court, preside and adjudicate.”).
207. TENN. CODE ANN. §17-2-108 (1996) (repealed 1997).
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expressly saying so, Professor Fitzpatrick implies that by judicial accountability
he means the ability to influence judicial decisions. In other words, he links
judicial accountability with majority public approval and finds it encouraging that
“judges who run in referenda . . . report . . . that the prospect of running in the
referenda influences their decisions on the bench.”208
But accountability to majority rule and thus susceptibility to majority
influence has never been the model for the American justice system. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter explained, “Courts are not representative bodies. They are not
designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. . . . Their essential quality is
detachment, founded on independence.”209 It was as important in 1870 that
judges remain independent from undue political influence as it was that the
people elect judges. It is disingenuous to assume, as Professor Fitzpatrick does,
that the constitution intended one motivation to completely displace the other.
In the Tennessee Plan, the legislature has created a judicial selection method
that satisfies the desire for public accountability while shielding judges from
undue political influence. It is a unique system that responds to concerns about
the absence of accountability by linking retention with satisfactory judicial
performance.210 By its passage, the legislature has evidenced its desire to provide
for accountability but not at the expense of excellence. Moreover, accountability
under the Tennessee Plan is based on criteria that signifies good judging,211 rather

208.
209.
210.
211.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 497.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27 (providing for the judicial performance and evaluation program).
Judicial performance is evaluated based on the following criteria:
(A) Integrity. In addition to other appropriate performance measures, the committee
shall consider: (1) avoidance of impropriety and appearance of impropriety; (2) freedom from
personal bias; (3) ability to decide issues based on the law and the facts without regard to the
identity of the parties or counsel, or the popularity of the decision and without concern for or
fear of criticism; (4) impartiality of actions; and (5) compliance with the Code of Judicial
Conduct contained in TENN. S. CT. R. 10.
(B) Knowledge and Understanding of the Law. In addition to other appropriate
performance measures, the committee shall consider: (1) understanding of substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary law; (2) attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the court;
and (3) proper application of judicial precedents and other appropriate sources of authority.
(C) Ability to Communicate. In addition to other appropriate performance measures,
the committee shall consider: (1) clarity of bench rulings and other oral communications;
(2) quality of written opinions with specific focus on clarity and logic, and the ability to explain
clearly the facts of the case and the legal precedents at issue; and (3) sensitivity to the impact
of demeanor and other nonverbal communications.
(D) Preparation and Attentiveness. In addition to other appropriate performance
measures, the committee shall consider: (1) judicial temperament, including courtesy to all
parties and participants; and (2) willingness to permit every person legally interested in a
proceeding to be heard, unless precluded by law or rules of court.
(E) Service to the Profession and the Public. In addition to other appropriate
performance measures, the committee shall consider: (1) efficient administration of caseload;
(2) attendance at and participation in judicial and continuing legal education
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than being at best a popularity contest and at worst a high dollar partisan political
race.212
Although Professor Fitzpatrick acknowledges that the judicial performance
evaluation system provides a measure of accountability, he argues that it does not
fulfill “democratic accountability” because judges receive favorable evaluations
and have routinely been retained. In other words, democracy fails unless judges
are defeated. This cynical viewpoint ignores the more likely explanation for the
positive evaluations and the high rate of retention among Tennessee’s appellate
judges—perhaps the judges are doing a good job. Those who have experience
with the Tennessee judiciary have attributed the high retention rate to the “high
caliber” of Tennessee’s appellate judges.213
If, as Professor Fitzpatrick posits, democracy fails unless judges are defeated,
then Tennessee’s popular election period was a complete democratic failure.
During that time, most Tennessee judges were appointed, not elected, to the
bench, and few were ever opposed for their seats.214 The tradition of appointment
and non-opposition was so entrenched, that by 1947, the method of choosing
state appellate judges would be described as an “approval” system:
[N]early 60 percent of the regular judges who have served on our Supreme
Court during the last one hundred years have been appointed by the Governor in
the first instance. . . . Judges appointed to serve out unexpired terms are
generally re-elected. Even when a judge first reaches the bench through the
election route, he is not as a rule selected by the electorate. He is selected by
the party leaders, and the party leaders are generally lawyers who have
considerable information as to their selectee’s qualifications for judicial office.
The election by the people is only a formal approval of such selection by the

programs; (3) participation in organizations which are devoted to improving the administration
of justice; (4) efforts to ensure that the court is serving the public and the justice system to the
best of its ability and in such a manner as to instill confidence in the court system; and
(5) service in leadership positions and within the organizations of the judicial branch of
government.
(F) Effectiveness in Working With Other Judges and Court Personnel. In addition to
other appropriate performance measures, the committee shall consider: (1) exchanging ideas
and opinions with other judges during the decision-making process; (2) commenting on the
work of colleagues; (3) facilitating the performance of the administrative responsibilities of
other judges; and (4) working effectively with court staff.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27 § 3.01.
212. The recent campaign for the position of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court cost
$8.2 million. JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES, & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2006, at 5 (Jesse Rutledge ed.), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/
files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf. The total spending in the race was $13.4 million. Id.
Alabama is not an aberration; record totals were spent in Georgia, Kentucky, Oregon, and
Washington in 2006 as well. Id. at 15.
213. See supra note 142.
214. See id.
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party leaders and that approval is generally obtained in Tennessee in an election
in which there is no opposition.215

Part II of this Essay responds to the remainder of the claims related more
generally to Professor Fitzpatrick’s claim that the Tennessee Plan is not fulfilling
the legislature’s purpose.
d. Rejection of the 1977 Constitutional Amendment Did Not Render the
Tennessee Plan Unconstitutional
Professor Fitzpatrick’s last point, which he characterizes as “powerful, but
not conclusive,”216 is that the voter’s rejection of the 1977 amendment favors the
conclusion that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional. This is an indefensible
and overly simplistic interpretation of the failed 1977 constitutional amendment.
There is no legal basis for using the public’s vote to evaluate the constitutionality
of a legislative enactment;217 nor is it proper to construe the vote as enjoining
future legislative reform for the courts.
Even if the law attached legal significance to a failed public initiative, which
it does not, it could not do so under the complex circumstances surrounding the
1977 Limited Tennessee Constitutional Convention. From the complex and
intricate history of the Convention, described earlier in this paper,218 Professor
Fitzpatrick urges one conclusion: The people rejected the judiciary amendment
because they wanted an elected judiciary. Under that logic, the 1979 statute
creating the Court of the Judiciary would be unconstitutional, because the voters
rejected the constitutional proposal to create the Court of Discipline and
Removal.219 Similarly, the 1989 statute providing for a state-wide public
defender system would be unconstitutional,220 because the voters rejected the
constitutional proposal requiring that the General Assembly provide for the
“adequate defense of indigents.”221 In addition, statutes providing for court

215. Parks, supra note 6, at 629 (quoting WILLIAM H. WICKER, Constitutional Revision and
the Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL SOUTHERN INSTITUTE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
12, 14 (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee – Knoxville 1947)).
216. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 498.
217. Professor Fitzpatrick cites Justice Souter’s dissent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), as authority for the proposition that “it is certainly not uncommon to
use [rejected constitutional amendments] to interpret the meaning of a constitution.” Fitzpatrick,
supra note 2, at 498 n.211. The case deals with the whether suits by Indian tribes against states had
been authorized by Congress consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 47. It’s relevance on the point for which it is cited seems totally illusory.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 106–26.
219. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-5-101 to -314 (1994 & Supp. 2007); see also supra note
118.
220. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-201 to -212.
221. This was the proposal set forth in section 12 of Proposal 13. Proclamation by the
Governor, supra note 114; see also supra note 118.
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redistricting222 and supreme court rulemaking223 would also violate the
constitution. Thus, Professor Fitzpatrick’s claim that the public’s failure to ratify
the judicial article represents a public mandate against merit selection finds no
support in the circumstances or in the law.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TENNESSEE PLAN’S FULFILLMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Just as the more complete story of Tennessee history has refined the
discussion of the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan, a more balanced
account of merit selection will inform the discussion of the Tennessee Plan’s
success in fulfilling its legislative purpose.
Merit selection of judges originated from dissatisfaction with judicial
elections, both partisan and nonpartisan. Roscoe Pound summarized this
dissatisfaction in a famous 1906 speech to the American Bar Association entitled
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice:
“Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in
many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”224
In 1914, Albert M. Kales of the American Judicature Society proposed an
alternative selection process in a series of writings.225 According to Kales, judges
should be selected by the entity that is “most emphatically legal, conspicuous,
subject directly to the electorate, and interested in and responsible for the due
administration of justice.”226 The Kales Plan called for judges to be appointed by
the chief justice, who would be popularly elected. Kales also proposed that a
“judicial council” be given the authority to compile an “eligible list” of attorneys
from which the chief justice would appoint judges.227
Under the Kales Plan, the tenure of judges appointed by the chief justice
would be determined by voters in periodic noncompetitive elections.228 Kales
believed that such elections “present[ed] the essential features of a recall and at
the same time [were] a fair substitute for the present periodic election” in that
they allowed the electorate to “retire unfit men” but relieved voters of the “largely
impossible” task of choosing which lawyers should serve as judges.229

222. See SCHEB & RECHICHAR, supra note 110, at 61–67; see also supra note 118.
223. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -408.
224. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 54, 66 (1962).
225. See ALBERT M. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1914); First
Draft of an Act to Establish a Model Court for a Metropolitan District, 4 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y
BULL. (1914); First Draft of a State-Wide Judicature Act, 7 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y BULL. (1914).
226. See First Draft of an Act to Establish a Model Court for a Metropolitan District, supra
note 225, at 36.
227. See KALES, supra note 225, at 250.
228. See First Draft of an Act to Establish a Model Court for a Metropolitan District, supra
note 225, at 149–53.
229. See First Draft of a State-Wide Judicature Act, supra note 225, at 164. While Professor
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Founder of the American Judicature Society Herbert Harley offered a
modified version of the Kales Plan in 1928, in which the governor would appoint
judges from a list of names compiled through a bar plebiscite.230 Participation of
laypersons in the judicial nominating process was first suggested in 1931 by the
Grand Jury Association in New York.231
In 1937, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution that combined
the elements proposed by Kales and Harley, recommending the “filling of
vacancies by appointment by the executive or other elective official or officials,
but from a list named by another agency, composed in part of high judicial
officers and in part of other citizens, selected for the purpose, who hold no other
public office.”232 The American Bar Association resolution called for
reappointment or retention elections after an initial term of office and periodically
thereafter.233
Versions of this nominative-appointive-elective plan were considered in
several states during the 1930s, but it was Missouri that first established what it
termed the “Nonpartisan Court Plan” in 1940.234 During the 1960s and 1970s,
twenty-three jurisdictions adopted what had become known as the “Missouri
Plan” or “merit selection.”235 Today, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia use merit selection to choose at least some of their judges.236
When the Tennessee legislature created the Tennessee Plan in 1971 it
announced four goals: selecting the best qualified judges, bringing more racial
and gender diversity to the bench, insulating judges from political pressure and
Fitzpatrick maintains that the “architects of merit selection” proposed retention elections to provide
“life tenure but without the appearance of life tenure,” historians report that retention elections had
two principal purposes: “to ensure that judges would be retained for lengthy terms of tenure once
they had been chosen on the basis of professional merit,” and “to accommodate the populists who
insisted on a mechanism to hold judges publicly accountable.” See CARBON & BERKSON, supra
note 122, at 6.
230. Editorial, The Eligible List of Judicial Candidates, 11 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 131
(1928).
231. See Glenn Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical
Development, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 36 (Glenn Winters ed.,
1973).
232. John Perry Wood, Basic Propositions Relating to Judicial Selection—Failure of Direct
Primary—Appointment Through Dual Agency—Judge to “Run on Record”, 23 A.B.A. J. 104–05
(1937).
233. See id.
234. Winters, supra note 231, at 36.
235. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS
(2008), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Merit_Charts_
0FC20225EC6C2.pdf (hereinafter CURRENT STATUS).
236. See id. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia use merit selection to make
initial appointments to some or all of their courts; nine states use merit selection to fill midterm
vacancies only. Id. Eight states and the District of Columbia require legislative confirmation of
gubernatorial appointments, and five states and the District of Columbia substitute a reappointment
process for retention elections. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1275456

536

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:501

influence, and enhancing the prestige of and public respect for the courts.237 In
the sections that follow, this Essay examines the extent to which merit selection
generally, and the Tennessee Plan specifically, accomplishes these objectives.
A. Selecting Highly Qualified Judges
Scholars have used a variety of approaches to address the question of
whether merit selection systems produce better judges than do other selection
methods, with mixed results.238 Some studies have compared the educational
backgrounds and professional experience of judges selected by appointment and
election. The most comprehensive analysis of this kind reported that meritselected and popularly-elected state high court judges did not differ significantly
in the extent of their legal or judicial experience, but merit-selected judges were
more likely than popularly-elected judges to have attended prestigious law
schools.239
Other research has compared judges’ performance once they attain their
seats. A recent study examined the work product of state high court judges and
concluded that, while elected judges were more productive than merit-selected
judges, appointed judges’ opinions were of higher quality.240 Some analyses have
assessed judicial performance through ratings or rankings by attorneys. Results
of a survey of corporate attorneys indicated that three of the five states whose
courts ranked highest on judges’ competence were states in which judges are
appointed, while four of the five lowest ranking states on this criterion were
elective states.241 These findings are consistent with an early study of the effects
237. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-101, -102 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
238. Some studies comparing appointed and elected judges utilize inaccurate data for some
judges, as they classify judges according to their formal selection method rather than the method
through which they actually attained their seats. According to Holmes and Emrey, 52% of judges
serving on high courts in elective states from 1964 to 2004 were initially appointed. Lisa M.
Holmes and Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing the State Courts of Last Resort
through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2006). Data available on the American
Judicature Society’s Judicial Selection in the States website indicates that 35% of judges currently
serving on high courts in states with contestable elections were initially appointed to their seats.
American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection, http://www.judicial
selection.us/judicial_selection/methods/justices_of_the_supreme_court.cfm?state (last visited May
28, 2008).
239. See Henry R. Glick and Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial
Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 231–33
(1987).
240. See Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary 1 (Univ. of Chi. Sch.
of Law, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989 (last visited May 20, 2008). Productivity was measured by the
number of opinions judges wrote; opinion quality was measured by the number of citations to
opinions by judges in other states. Id. at 2.
241. See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2008: RANKING
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of the Missouri Plan. While substantial proportions of both elected and meritselected judges ranked in the highest quartile, fewer merit-selected than elected
judges were ranked in the lowest quartile, suggesting that a merit plan “tend[ed]
to eliminate the selection of very poor judges . . . .”242
A third approach to assessing whether appointive systems select “better”
judges than elective systems is to compare the number of disciplinary incidents in
which appointed and elected judges have been involved. Studies of this kind have
uniformly found that elected judges were disciplined and removed from office
with greater frequency than were appointed judges.243
It is not surprising that studies have found meaningful differences between
judges chosen in appointive and elective systems. In a merit selection system, the
emphasis is on qualifications and experience at the outset, and only the best
qualified applicants are eligible for appointment. The Tennessee Plan is an
example of how this process works in practice. Judicial vacancies are publicized
when they occur, and applications are solicited from candidates who meet the
constitutional and statutory requirements. Applicants are required to provide
information about their professional background, judicial and administrative
experience, education, and achievements. The judicial selection commission
convenes a public meeting to receive comments on potential candidates,
investigates and interviews applicants, and forwards the names of the three best
qualified individuals to the governor.244 There is no similar screening process for
STATES 14 (2008), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/lawsuit
climate2008/pdf/LawsuitClimateReport.pdf. The top ranking states were Delaware, Minnesota,
Virginia, Nebraska, and Indiana; the lowest ranking states were Louisiana, Mississippi, West
Virginia, Alabama, and Hawaii. Id. A follow-up analysis indicated that the average ranking of
states with merit selection of judges (i.e., gubernatorial appointment from a nominating
commission) was higher than states with any other selection method, while states with partisan
judicial elections had the lowest average ranking. See Joshua C. Hall & Russell S. Sobel, Is the
“Missouri Plan” Good for Missouri? The Economics of Judicial Selection, POLICY STUDY
(Show-Me
Institute,
St.
Louis,
Mo.),
May
21,
2008,
available
at
http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_15.pdf.
242. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE
BAR 283 (1969).
243. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection
in New York City 1977–2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 808–10 (2004) (from 1977 to 2002,
judges of New York City’s Civil Court, who are elected, were substantially more likely to be
disciplined than judges of the Criminal and Family Courts, who are appointed); CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, SUMMARY OF DISCIPLINE STATISTICS 1990–1999,
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/publicat.htm (disciplinary rates for elected judges from 1990 to 1999
were higher than those for judges who were initially appointed); The Florida Bar, Merit Selection
and Retention, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001. nsf/BIP+List?OpenForm (last
visited May 28, 2008) (follow “Merit Selection and Retention” hyperlink) (since 1970, ten of the
thirteen judges removed from the bench were elected rather than merit-selected, and 73% of the
judges disciplined since 1998 initially reached the bench via election).
244. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-109 (1994 & Supp. 2007). When filling appellate
vacancies, the governor may request a supplemental list of three names but is required to appoint a
THE
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potential candidates in states with contestable elections, and political connections
can take precedence over professional credentials.245
As has already been discussed, Tennessee has supplemented its selection and
retention processes with a performance evaluation program designed both to
promote judicial self-improvement and to enable voters to make more informed
decisions in retention elections.246 Under the Tennessee Plan, attorneys, other
judges, and court personnel are asked to evaluate judges on several criteria,
including integrity, knowledge and understanding of the law, ability to
communicate, preparation and attentiveness, service to the profession, and
effectiveness in working with other judges and court personnel.247 The results of
the evaluations of appellate judges are made public along with a recommendation
for or against retention.248 No similar, official performance evaluation programs
exist in elective states.
The Tennessee Plan, both in theory and in practice, selects and retains highly
qualified judges.
B. Bringing More Diversity to the Bench
Numerous studies have addressed whether particular selection methods are
more likely to place diverse candidates on the bench, but the findings have been
inconsistent.249 While most of these studies consider only a state’s formal
selection method rather than how a judge actually reached the bench,250 a recent
analysis of state high courts over a forty-year period took into account the
frequency of interim appointments in elective states and reported that gender and
racial diversification is more likely to occur through interim appointments than
elections.251 The demographics of state appellate courts in 2008 confirm these
judge from the second list. Id. § 17-4-112(a).
245. In 2007, New York State created Independent Judicial Election Qualification
Committees, a statewide network of screening panels to review the qualifications of trial court
candidates. See New York State Unified Court System, Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge,
http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/150.shtml (last visited May 30, 2008). These
committees are not comparable to nominating commissions, however, in that they simply rate
candidates as qualified or not qualified, and candidates are not required to submit to screening in
order to run for office.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 134–42.
247. See TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-201; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27.
248. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(a)(1), (c).
249. Compare, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State
and Federal Appellate Benches,1985 to 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 88–91 (2001) (women and
minorities were no more likely to become state appellate judges under merit systems than non-merit
systems), with M.L. HENRY, THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL
OFFICE (1985) (women and minorities were more likely to attain judgeships through appointive
systems than elective systems).
250. See supra note 238.
251. See Holmes & Emrey, supra note 238, at 7. A similar study found that women are
significantly more likely to be selected to state high courts when initially appointed. See Kathleen
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findings, with 65% of women judges and 76% of minority judges having been
appointed rather than elected to their positions.252
A chief advantage of a merit selection system is that it is possible to structure
the process so that opportunities for selecting a more diverse group of judges are
enhanced.253 The Tennessee Plan calls for consideration of the racial and gender
population of the state in the appointment of members of the judicial selection
commission,254 and research has demonstrated that demographically diverse
nominating commissions attract more diverse applicants and select more diverse
nominees.255
According to data provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts,
Tennessee’s judicial selection commission has screened candidates for eightyseven vacancies since 1994.256 The commission has recommended 245
applicants to the governor to fill these vacancies, including sixty-three women
and twenty-eight minorities. Of the governor’s eighty appointees, twenty-two
have been women and seven have been minorities. This contrasts markedly with
the composition of Tennessee’s benches before merit selection.257 In the last
decade alone, the number of women serving as appellate judges has tripled and
the number of minorities serving on appellate benches has doubled.258
In Tennessee and nationwide, appointive systems have provided more
diversity on appellate courts than have elective systems.

A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the
Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q.
504, 504 (2002).
252. These figures include judges chosen through merit selection, gubernatorial appointment,
or judicial appointment. Data on file with authors.
253. For a discussion of measures that may be used to promote diversity among nominating
commission members and judicial appointees, see Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an
Appointive System of Selecting Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485 (2007).
254. See TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-102(b)(3), (d) (1994 & Supp. 2007).
255. See Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial Merit Selection
Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 (American Judicature
Society ed., 2000).
256. Data provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts is on file with the authors.
257. See GENTRY CROWELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1988–1989, at
222–31 (1989); GENTRY CROWELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1989–1990,
at 226–35 (1990); RILEY C. DARNELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1991–
1994, at 248–58 (1994); RILEY C. DARNELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK
1995–1996, at 254–63 (1996); RILEY C. DARNELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE
BOOK 1997–1998, at 250–60 (1998); RILEY C. DARNELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE
BLUE BOOK 1999–2000, at 264–73 (2000); RILEY C. DARNELL, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE,
TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 2001–2004, at 288–97 (2004).
258. See sources cited supra note 257.
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C. Limiting Politics in Judicial Selection
Regardless of which judicial selection method is used, it is impossible to
entirely eliminate politics from the selection process.259 In fact, in some
appointive states, partisan politics is an explicit part of the process, with partisan
balance required on judicial nominating commissions260 or on the courts
themselves.261 But merit selection systems minimize the role of politics in
judicial selection. Judicial aspirants in merit plan states are not required to raise
money, seek party support, or campaign for office as are judicial candidates in
elective states; and judicial campaigns in recent years have come to closely
resemble campaigns for legislative and executive positions.
Judicial elections for the past decade have been characterized by
unprecedented campaign fundraising and spending, increased special interest
group involvement, and relaxed ethical standards for candidate speech. In the last
four election cycles, candidates for state high courts have raised more than double
the amount raised in the 1990s.262 In a 2004 Illinois contest, candidates for a
single district-based seat on the supreme court raised nearly $10 million,
exceeding fundraising in eighteen of the thirty-four U.S. Senate races that year.263
In 2006, candidates for the Alabama Supreme Court shattered previous records
for judicial elections, raising a total of $13.4 million.264
At the same time, special interest groups have ramped up their efforts to
influence the composition of state courts—making contributions to candidates,
funding television advertising through independent expenditures, and pressuring
candidates to discuss their political views. In the 2005–2006 election cycle, 44%
of the contributions to state high court candidates came from business groups,
and 21% came from trial attorneys.265 These special interest groups also spent a
total of more than $5 million on television ads in ten states with high court races
in 2005–2006,266 and in an April 2008 Wisconsin race, special interest groups
spent approximately $4 million on a single supreme court race.267
259. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing
the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315 (2001) (voter reactions to controversial
policy issues and the extent of partisan composition in the state affected outcomes in all types of
judicial elections—partisan, nonpartisan, and retention).
260. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Nebraska, New York,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 235.
261. These states include Delaware and New Jersey. See American Judicature Society,
Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us (last visited May 20, 2008) (click on
individual states shown on interactive map).
262. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 212, at 15.
263. See Robert Barnes, Judicial Races Now Rife with Politics, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 28,
2007.
264. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 212, at 15.
265. See id. at 18.
266. See id. at 3.
267. See Emma Schwartz, Elections for Judges are Getting Nastier, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Apr. 4, 2008.
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Outside groups have also expanded their efforts to ascertain judicial
candidates’ views on controversial issues, distributing questionnaires regarding
their positions on such subjects as abortion, the death penalty, and same-sex
marriage, and publicizing their responses and failures to respond.268 And in
recent elections, candidates have been less constrained than in the past in
responding to such questionnaires. According to a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court
decision, candidates for state court seats are free to announce their views on legal
and political issues—issues that may later come before them as judges.269
While no system of selecting judges can be completely insulated from
politics, merit selection systems negate the importance of electoral campaigning,
interest group activity, and candidate fundraising in the selection process.
D. Enhancing Public Confidence in the Courts
The increased politicization of judicial elections has not gone unnoticed by
voters, and it seems to have taken a toll on the public’s confidence in its courts.
According to recent national surveys, between two-thirds and three-fourths of
Americans believe that the need to raise money to conduct their campaigns
influences judges’ decisions.270 More than four in five Americans are concerned
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White will lead to special interest groups pressuring candidates to take positions
on controversial issues,271 and nine in ten fear that special interests are trying to
use the courts to shape economic and social policy.272 These concerns are
reinforced by research that identifies correlations between campaign contributions
and judicial decisions.273
268. See Marcia Coyle, Judicial Surveys Vex the Bench, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept.
8, 2006.
269. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
270. See ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR
THE
COURTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf (69% of respondents
believed that the need to raise money for elections affects judges’ rulings to a moderate or great
extent); JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, AMERICANS SPEAK OUT ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1 (2004),
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/ZogbyPollFactSheet.pdf (71% of respondents
believed that campaign contributions from interest groups have at least some influence on judges’
decisions); JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS 7 (2001),
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurvey Results.pdf (67% of
respondents believed that individuals or groups who give money to judicial campaigns often receive
favorable treatment).
271. See AMERICANS SPEAK OUT ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 270, at 1.
272. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS, supra note 270, at 9.
273. See, e.g., TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY: HOW BIG MONEY BUYS ACCESS TO
THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT (2001), available at http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/
paytoplay/paytoplay.pdf (the Texas Supreme Court was four times more likely to accept a case for
review if the petitioner had contributed to a justice’s campaign); Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A.
McCall, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisions, and the Texas Supreme Court: Assessing
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On the other hand, substantial majorities of voters nationwide and in
individual states support merit selection and retention systems.274 These systems
significantly limit the involvement of parties, special interests, and money in the
selection of judges, and in so doing, they preserve the public’s confidence in its
courts.
CONCLUSION
A few weeks before these Essays, wrestling with the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan, were published, Tennessee’s unique system for electing appellate
court judges with its mutual accommodation of judicial independence and public
accountability was dealt a likely fatal blow by the Tennessee General Assembly.
Set to sunset in 2008, the Plan needed legislation to keep it alive. Because the
legislation did not pass, the Plan is set to wind down completely in 2009, unless
new legislation is passed. If the Tennessee legislature fails to revive the
Tennessee Plan during the next calendar year, the Plan’s demise will not be
attributable to either author’s rhetoric or logic, nor will it signify a considered
rejection of merit selection. Rather, as has been true from the beginning,
Tennessee’s merit selection system will be yet another bargaining chip gambled
away at the tables of the Tennessee General Assembly.275

the Appearance of Impropriety, 90 JUDICATURE 214 (2007) (the likelihood of a justice voting in a
party’s favor was significantly higher if the party contributed to the justice’s campaign); Vernon
Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical
Study of the Effect of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1291 (2008) (in
nearly half of the cases heard by the court over a fourteen-year period, a litigant or attorney had
contributed to at least one justice’s campaign, and on average, justices voted in favor of contributors
65% of the time); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings,
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006 (over a twelve-year period, justices of the Ohio Supreme Court
routinely participated in cases involving campaign contributors and, on average, voted in favor of
contributors 70% of the time).
274. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS, supra note 270, at 12 (71% of voters
nationwide supported a general merit selection and retention proposal); Memorandum from Patrick
Lanne, Public Opinion Strategies, to Interested Parties (Dec. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/MissouriMemoAndOverallResults.pdf (71% of Missourians
supported the state’s current system of judicial merit selection and retention); Justice at Stake
Campaign, Minnesota Statewide Survey January 2008, http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/
MinnesotaJusticeatStakesurvey.pdf (last visited May 28, 2008) (74% of Minnesotans supported
merit selection of judges with retention elections and performance evaluation).
275. [EDITOR’S NOTE: Professor Fitzpatrick has written a reply to this Essay. It is posted at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1152413.]
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